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On The Algebraic Representation
of Causality
Giving Mathematical Expression
to Philosophical Decisions
Roy Lisker
I. Introduction
 It is always the case when a causal framework is introduced
into the descriptions of the natural sciences that a  philosophical
analysis,
( sometimes a decision on one side or the other of a traditional
philosophical problem) ,  is being translated into a mathematical
representation. Ideally this will be quantitative, although this is
not always necessary.  For example, the teleological arguments
coming from  the 2-fold Darwinian mechanisms of adaptation and
natural selection - whenever it is argued that certain structures are
present in a living organism because   they enhance ( or once did
enhance) survival - are not strictly quantitative. In general
however, these suggest a formal dialectic which can readily  be
given mathematical form. Examples are the morphological
transformation schemes of d’Arcy Thompson,  the epigenetic
landscapes of C.H. Waddington, and the modeling methods  of
Catastrophe Theory,
The philosophical analysis clarifies  the causal concept , the
philosophical decision selects among various hypotheses and
classical ideological positions,  while the mathematical
representation translates  the conceptual foundations into
symbolic, functional or schematic forms . These may now take on a
life of their own, with no further appeal to their philosophical
origins.
One of the real strengths of mathematics is  that it is free of
any attachment to its motivating concerns. The Theory of
Probability originated in the desire to predict the outcomes of card
games and other types of gambling; yet today’s probabilists are
not obliged to take an interest in gambling , or even know how to
play cards.
In the same way, the most rudimentary causal schemes are
based on a primitive “before and after” relationship. These lead in
a natural fashion  to the study of totally and partially ordered sets:
lattices, ordinals and order types. These can  be studied quite
apart from any application to causal structures, or may even
suggest other possibilities, ( such as those present in J.L. Borges
famous story : “The Garden of the Forking Paths”) , for causation
that may eventually be applicable to natural phenomena.
The paradigm 1   for all such procedures for the translation of
causal notions into mathematics  is the  Quantum Theory. Only a
partial list can be given of all of the mathematical structures which
have emerged from the fundamental  insight that energy is
emitted in discrete particles or quanta:
(1) Heisenberg’s Matrices
(2) Schrödinger’s Wave Equation
(3) Dirac’s Bra-Ket Formalism
(4) von Neumann’s Operator Algebras
(5) Feynman’s Amplitudes; Diagrams;
Integral
(6) Jauch-Piron Propositional Lattices
(7) Bohm’s Hidden Variables
(8) Irving Segal’s Jordan Algebras
(9) Mackey’s Measure Spaces
(10) Reichenbach’s 3-valued logic
(11) Popper’s Scatter Ensembles
(12) Gudder’s Non-Standard Arithmetics
In this paper we will spend some time examining the first 4
of these, with occasional  references to the others. Yet  even in
those sciences which are not readily quantifiable: Psychology,
Economics, Sociology, Anthropology,  Journalism, the so-called
“human sciences” , one can trace the development of this process
                                    
1 Thomas Kuhn has forever altered the meaning of the word “paradigm”.  In our usage
however we adhere to the older, more traditional uses of the word as defined in the
following dictionary references:
(1)  paradigm...pattern, example...serving as a pattern or example
-The Barnhart Dictionary of Etymology  H.W. Wilson 1988
(2)  paradigm... An example; a pattern followed; a typical example; an epitome...
paradigm case   : a case or instance to be regarded as representative or typical.
-The New Shorter Oxford Dictionary, Vol.2 , Clarendon Press 1993 )
It is evident for example in  Geology, which possesses  a
conflict as  inherent to its  character as  a Kantian antinomy ,
between Uniformitarianism and Catastrophism. It is present in the
stimulating  controversies of Biology, those surrounding the
mechanisms of Evolution, those challenging the authenticity of
the fossil record ( Paleontology ) , those which debate the relative
roles of Nature vs. Nurture . Cosmology has  its exotic mix of great
explosions ,  inflationary scenarios , a bushelful of solution spaces
for Einstein’s field equations , and   homogeneity and isotropy
principles.
In the writing of History  one uncovers every species of
methodological dilemma: observer/ observed , determinism vs. free
will , teleology vs. chaos , gradualist/catastrophist synchronic vs.
diachronic perspectives , objectivity/ subjectivity, community
versus the individual versus the idea  as historical determinants .
Indeed, considered as a science, history is so forbiddingly  difficult
that one imagines that only the most disciplined and gifted
scholars would dare to enter the field; which is why one is always
making the sad discovery  that most historians are little more than
mediocre jingoists, vaunting monarchy, war, “great man” theories
, “imperial glory” delusions , tabloid  psychologism and so on. 2
Yet good or bad, a historian must be first and foremost practice
competent  philosophizing  on  the mechanisms of historical
causation. All the same , unless he is a Marxist  or at least some
kind of Hegelian, the translation of his framework of historical
causation into logical , algebraic or functional schemes, cannot
easily be envisaged .
                                    
2 We hasten to exclude from this  demonization such names as Herodotus, Thucydides , Ibn
Khaldun , Fernand Braudel,  Simon Schama , H. R.Trevor-Roper , Burchart, Arthur Symons,
and many others.
For  most of the  human sciences  mathematical
representations of causality cannot advance beyond a surface
level, even though the schemes  that do emerge may be very
complex: Keynesian economics, game theory, glottochronology,
the lattice structure of the hominid tree, the kinship structures of
organized societies around the world
 By making  a close examination of the traditional
interpretations of causality in different scientific fields  one
quickly discovers that  many possibilities for mathematical
modeling of causal schemes,  consonant  with standard
philosophical preferences ,  are often overlooked  . An even more
controversial finding is  that the ideal of causality which is
incorporated into the conceptual framework of a certain science
may not  correspond to  the  assumptions about causality  actually
employed  in the daily  practice of that science  .
A fundamental idea  underlies everything  in this essay : a
certain kind of  philosophical perspective on  causation leads to a
certain kind of mathematics. Different philosophical positions lead
to different mathematics. In every philosophical system for
causation that is rich enough to serve as the foundation for some
natural science one generally finds an abundance of equivalent
mathematical representations: quantum theory being , once again,
the paradigm .  In specific practical applications  these may  reduce
to algorithms for predicting the future from the present.  Thus , in
the elucidation of causal structure, mathematics plays an
intermediary role between philosophy and observation. Most
significantly it rarely, if in fact it ever does,  arise from the
uninterpreted data of observation.
II. Causal Function Algebras
   The construction of  a Causal  Algebra of functions ,
algorithms and/or operators is  the key  to any mathematical
representation of causal principles. This is a set or space 3  of
entities which, through their permitted modes of combination
relative to the dimension of time,  model the causal structure.
Causation necessarily takes place in time. However the
topological character of the time dimension, ( infinite in one or
both directions, open or closed, circular, branching, etc. ) need not
be specified in advance but may be derivable indirectly from the
nature of the entities in the causal algebra.
     Other independent  magnitudes entering into
calculations of the forms and functions of the causal algebra will
be the vectorial quantities that define the atemporal
representation  spaces for the  phenomena under consideration.
Their ranges may be anything: real or complex numbers, other
functions, indeterminates, etc., even ideas such as “wave”, or
“particle”. An example of the latter is found in the following
metaphorical algebraic construction:
Let O stands for “ 1-slit apparatus”
T    “           “     “2-slit apparatus
E     “          “       “ Electron “
P      “          “       “ Particle “
W     “         “        “ Wave”
Then we have the ‘equations’ :
                                    
3 In our terminology:
Set : Any entity constructible through and consistent with  the Zermelo-Fraenkel
Axioms of Set Theory.
Space : A collection of indeterminate  entities that becomes a set through the
specification of n of them, where n is finite or countable. Thus, Euclidean 2- space
becomes a set when any three  of its points (  say 
p1 = (0,0), p2 = (0,1) and
p3 = (1,0)
 .
The purpose of the 3rd point is to establish the direction of positive orientation.
O (E ) =   P
T(E)     =  W
The “space” for this  Causal Algebra  is The Space of
Apparatuses    for determining the particulate or wave nature  of
elementary particles.  Its “domain” could be  the collection of all
electrons in the universe, whereas its  “range” consists of the two
terms “particle” and “wave”. Thus we see that a Causal Algebra
need not be expressed in terms of operators or functions
ultimately acting on numbers. In this example, the temporal
dimension enters into the various ways in which One- and Two-
Slit Apparatuses , ( and presumably others )  can be combined in
parallel and series, to produce outputs of “particle” or “wave” or
combinations of these with differing probabilities,  on ensembles
of particles.
Causal Algebras have both an Extrinsic and an Intrinsic
Structure.
(a) The Extrinsic Structure:
Any Causal Algebra , C   will, in general, contain functions ,
f,g,..., function spaces F, G,....operators H , and Operator Spaces
H . For example, in the full elaboration of the Quantum Theory,
one has :
 - Schrödinger Wave Functions , { ψα }
- Complete families of Orthogonal Functions , { Ωα }
- Observable Operators : Energy, Momentum, etc.
 - Families of Unitary Linear Operators : scalar, vector,
tensor, differential forms, integral transformations, von Neumann
Algebras, Jordan Algebras, etc.
All of these things will be covered by the generic term
“agent”, since  it is their common attribute that they all act on
something beyond themselves, a space, a geometry, real or
complex numbers, etc.
The extrinsic structure of a Causal Algebra , C , is the set of
rules by which agents may be put together in combination to
produce other agents. Thus, let U   be the class of hypermaximal
self-adjoint operators acting on the closed Hilbert Space  H. Then
if K and L are operators in  U   , then K+L will also be  in  U  ,
but KL will only be in U   if they commute. Likewise, if O  is the
class of invertible matrices, and A, B,  ε  O    ,   then AB and BA
will be in O  , but A+B may not be .
The extrinsic structure of a causal algebra therefore consists
of the complete set of combination rules under which  its set S of
agents is closed.  which are closed in S . This definition naturally
extends the standard notion of a function algebra , closed under
multiplication, addition and subtraction, multiplication by scalars
and functional composition.
If   C is to be a appropriate model for some conception of
causation, ideally every composition rule will reflect some feature
of that conception.
Examples:  
 [ A ] : Any space E of functions  modeling “entropy”
must respect the 2ND Law of Thermodynamics : The absolute
quantity of entropy in an isolated system always increases. E  then
must be a subclass of the space M  of all monotonically increasing
functions of time, which is closed under addition, multiplication
by a positive number, composition and time translation.  Neither
E nor M    are not closed under subtraction:
¬(∀f ,g∈E⇒ f − g∈E)
This statement does in fact reflect an important property of
thermal systems: heat does not move from a cold to a warmer
body.
[ B ] :  Let T   be the class of all ‘motions’ of a particle
p, along a single spatial dimension, x, as a function of time, t. The
Light Principle of Special  Relativity states that energy cannot be
transported across space at a speed exceeding c, the speed of light.
The subclass T of  T  which models the Light Principle for
material objects consists of functions x = f(t) such that f ' (x) < c
for every value of t. This class can be enlarged to include functions
for which
f+
' (t) ≠ f−' (t)  at certain ‘jump points ‘ of the derivative. To be
precise we define T as the class of functions such that Max|f
’(x)|=m < c , and T
_
 as the boundary of T :  this includes those
functions which equal c at some points, or  may converge to ± c as
t goes to + or - infinity.
T
X
x=ct
B
A
Figure 1
(Functional arcs in half-plane A never cross the light
cone)
Note that, although jumps of the derivative    are allowed,
spontaneous jumps along the trajectory of f    are forbidden; also
that non-right or left-differentiable functions -at any point! - are
also forbidden.
What is the extrinsic structure of this class of functions? If f,g
ε T  , and  x = h( A, B ; t ) ) = Af(t) + Bg(t) , then
x’ = Af’(t) + Bg’(t)
| Af’(t) + Bg’(t) | ≤  |A| |f’(t)| + |B||g’(t)|   ≤ c ( |A| +
|B| ) .
Therefore if A| + |B| ≤ 1 , then h (A,B ; t) will always be in T  .
This is an example of an extrinsic law, but it is not ‘natural’ to
Relativity.
In general h ε T if Max Af ' (t)+ Bg' (t) = m < c  Here  we are
ignoring the subtleties of jumps in the derivative, but this
extension is easily made. Differentiating,  we find that the critical
points of this expression are at:
Af ' ' (t)+ Bg' ' (t) = 0, or
A
B = −
g' ' (t)
f ' ' (t)
= a(t) ,that is
Ba(t) = A
There is now some intrigue to this problem, because we
must solve the equation for “a”  , for every combination of values
A and B, and single out those for which the expression for the first
derivative is bounded away from c. However, since
 
Max Af ' (t)+ Bg' (t) = m < c⇒
Max kAf ' (t)+ kBg' (t) = km < kc
we know that for any pair of values (A,B) which satisfy this
condition, the entire segment of values (kA, kB)  |k|≤ 1 also
satisfy that condition. So far we have been considering
mathematical  composition laws   for the spaces T and  T
_
  .
However, relativistic motions do not compose under these relations
but under the hyperbolic tangent law   :
(+) h' =
f ' + g'
1− f 'g' c2
Under the normal interpretation of relativistic composition of
velocities, the previous  relations have no physical meaning. What
other composition laws are there in this space which have a
meaningful interpretation in Special Relativity?  Consider the
motion x = mcos t  , where m < c. The derivative of this is
x' = −msin t  , which has a maximum of m . This can be
interpreted as a relativistic “clock” that ‘ticks’ at each reversal of
direction along the x-axis, at the times t = 0 ,  ±2nπ . If we modify
the first  equation to  x = mAcos(t A) , then the system will still
change direction at the maximum value m in each direction, but its
period will be reduced to   P  = 2π/A . Since these are permissible
relativistic motions, this fact has the following interpretation: There
is nothing in the theory of Special Relativity which prohibits the
construction of clocks of any period   .
One is thus led to make a distinction between two kinds of
composition laws for the motions of T  ( T
_
 )
I . Mathematical  Composition Laws, those suggested by the
symmetries inherent to the function space. An example is:
(m) A + B = 1,and f ,gεT⇒
h = Af + BgεT
II. Relativistic Composition Laws such as
(+) f ,gεT⇒ hεT, where
h' =
f ' + g'
1− f 'g' c2
 , and
(p) m < c,A ≠ 0⇒ x = mAcos(t A)εT
Hence, T , as a Causal Algebra for Relativity  , contains ( + )
and ( p ) in its extrinsic structure, whereas ( m ) is not in the
extrinsic structure.
There is a related Causal Algebra in which ( m ) does fit ,
which we may label Tˆ ⊂ T. Tˆ  bears the roughly  the same
relationship to T that a Lie Algebra bears to a Lie group. Let κ  be
a constant with the property that the relativistic effects on objects
moving at  speeds  κc  or less are undetectable   . We then define
Tˆ    as the subset of T  consisting of motions f ,  such that m =
Max|f’| ≤  κc/2 . In this subspace the margin of error between
relativistic addition (+)  and ordinary addition ( m )  is
undetectable. Observe that, although addition is a valid extrinsic
composition law for  Tˆ   , it  is not closed under addition.
(b) The Intrinsic Structure
What really distinguishes one scientific discipline from all
others, apart from its  subject matter, ( which may overlap or
sometimes even be identical)  is its  catalogue of representation
spaces. Let us look at some standard examples : Statistical
Mechanics studies the behavior of ensembles of systems in Phase
Space  ; Special Relativity is enacted  in Minkowski Space-Time;
General Relativity in Riemannian 4-manifolds with inertial index -
2;  Quantum Mechanics lives in Position Space, Momentum Space
, Hilbert Spaces, and spaces of operator algebras, or Banach Spaces
; String Theories employ very elaborate and abstract
representation spaces; Lagrangian Mechanics operates over
isolated  systems in Configuration Space , while Hamiltonian
Mechanics operates on single systems in Phase Space, or on
bundles formed from the same system translated along a
continuous spectrum of initial conditions .
The representation spaces for Biology are likewise
interpenetrated with graphs and lattices: hereditary trees,
Aristotelian and Linnaen classification schemes, graph structures
for chemical reactions , genetic codes ....
This characterization is no less true of the Human Sciences
than of the Natural. Scientific theories do address themselves
directly to observations or raw data, but to the pictures  we build
upon  these observations and data . Such  pictures are sketched ,
modeled, elaborated, then displayed in a “plenum ” whose nature
is  purely conceptual , which  in its ultimate refinement is
mathematical. It is from these images that theories arise which,
when applied to them, generate predictions which are tested
against   further observations of natural phenomena.
Consider a science such as psycho-analysis, which many, (
myself included), prefer to classify as a pseudo-science. Sigmund
Freud’s many  representation schemes are crude to the point of
embarrassment . All of his models are rife with  internal
inconsistencies , while being   in contradiction with one another.
Yet any one of them  , whether it be  the libido theory, the
instinct theory ,  the mechanism  of repression, the Oedipus
Complex, can be reduced without much difficulty to a collection
of schematic diagrams like engineer’s blueprints,  similar to those
that depict the workings of a steam engine, a hydraulic pump  or a
storage battery,  some sort of mechanical system.
In the repression theory for example, the Unconscious is a
“place” , into which “painful thoughts” are “pushed”, or
“buried”, and kept there by a kind of “censor” that looks
remarkably like a steam engine’s safety valve. In the schematology
of the Oedipus Complex, illicit sexual desire is “balanced” by the
fear of patriarchal punishment. In this picture all the emotions,
love, jealousy, fear, hatred, guilt, anxiety are ingeniously coupled
in a dynamic though stable equilibrium like the ropes, cams, gears
and pulleys of an elaborate waterwheel.
No science ever makes predictions other than through
appeal to the abstract model in its appropriate representation
space. Predictions are made on  the model , then  tested through
interaction with external reality.
The Intrinsic Structure of a Causal Algebra therefore
consists of the set of predictive mechanisms , constructed from
agents in permissible combinations, acting   in the representation
space  to produce , from present data , hypothetical models in
other locations of space-time which can then be tested against
experience or experiment.
Using quantum theory as an example, its  agents are
Operators acting over Hilbert Spaces  and functions acting over
Configuration Spaces ( position or momentum) .
The Extrinsic Causal Structure  of Quantum Theory   holds
the rules for composing operators and families of operators . For
Spin Operators these would be the properties of the tensor
product.
The Intrinsic Causal Structure of Quantum Theory   consists
of the rules and algorithm whereby one calculates eigenvalues and
probabilities. Thus   < E >= φ*|E|φdx3∫   would be in the
Intrinsic Structure.
In the case of  Special Relativity, the extrinsic structure
contains the Lorentz group; the intrinsic structure applies the
functions of this group to the calculation of  length contractions,
time dilations, and mass increases  in Minkowski Space.
Even historiography can be shown to exhibit  representation
spaces , agents, an extrinsic structure and an intrinsic structure.
Since interpretation is an inherent part of this science, these will
differ  from one historian to the next. No Hegelian would dispute
this. However all historians relate their epics within a framework
of assumptions about the ‘motors’ or ‘forces’ that have shaped the
world. They also avail themselves of various theories about the
way human nature works; these can on occasion be quite
involuted. Still, there never was a historian for whom it was
possible to describe the course of events in past or present society
without speculation on human motives.
Our focus in this essay is not on the subject matter of the
sciences per se, but  on their underlying  structure of causation.
All of  science depends ultimately on prediction. Even
mathematics is restricted by the possibility that errors may  turn
up at some point in demonstrations or initial assumptions.  Back-
reconstructive sciences such as geology depend on the uncovering
of new evidences to decide between conflicting models of the
past. Journalism,  in the best sense the historiography of the
present, may be either invalidated  or confirmed by new evidence
.
It is therefore the case that, for every  science,  one can
always derive, from their formal description, the structure of one
or more causal algebras ,  C = ( A   , E, I , R  ) , where
A    is the class of agents ( functions, operators,
etc.)
E is the extrinsic structure
I   is the intrinsic structure
R  is the class of  representation spaces
One does not find the representations of the causal concepts
in the  class of agents or their representation spaces, which are
incorporated in  the extrinsic structure ( rules by which the agents
combine among themselves), and  the intrinsic structure ( actions
of the agents on the representation spaces generating  predictions
) .
What is meant by extrinsic versus intrinsic causation can best
be seen through specific examples , to which we now turn:
Example I
“Every effect is also a cause.”
The statement   “Every effect is also a cause” has numerous
interpretations. Corresponding to  each is  an appropriate causal
algebra. The Kantian perspective  4  notwithstanding , the concept
contained in this assertion  is neither self-evident nor  a synthetic
apriori   .  In those sciences for which teleological descriptions are
the standard , it may be  either invalid or irrelevant. With the
general acknowledgment of  Darwin’s 2-stage evolutionary
mechanism  the community of biologists inherited  a predilection
for   teleological “explanations”  for the presence of even the most
anomalous animal  body parts. The result has been a bizarre union
of  a random mechanism ( adaptation) , with a determinist
tautology ( selection ) , Not all of them are ‘adaptationists’, the
extreme right wing,  one might say,  of this position, but many of
them arrogate to themselves a peculiar talent for diagnosis, a
special ability for discovering what things were “for “  , essentially
a form of Platonism through the back door.  Of course if one asks
them directly, none of them would ever confess to a belief that
objects in the natural world hold the imprint of heavenly
intentions.
                                    
4 By the “Kantian perspective”  , or “Kantian paradigm”, or more generally “Leibniz/Kantian
paradigm” we shall mean the interpretation  of causation as expressed in Analogies 1 , 2 and 3,
( Analogy 2 in particular ) , in the Critique of Pure Reason   .
In the worse cases, tautology blends with Panglossianism in
an intimate weave: Why do creatures  have eyes?   To see with of
course . Why do most mammals have  tails?    To enhance balance,
to flick flies, as sexual ornaments, to extend the chassis of
horizontal organization, to wrap around trees when climbing, to
express joy or anxiety.  Whatever reasons particular biologists may
advance for special cases , the Kuhnian paradigm of biology
asserts , ( with appropriate cautions) that  tails increase the chances
for survival ,otherwise animals wouldn’t have them  !  Therefore
human beings don’t have them, because if we did, they would
hinder our survival, etc.
The philosophical challenges and dilemmas of these forms of
circular  reasoning  have been exhaustively discussed by many
others. One cannot deny the validity of the Darwinian mechanism
in small-scale adaptation and change, and most of the arguments
center around  large-scale historical phenomena.
We will continue our discussion of the  causal postulate “
Every effect is also a cause”  , under 4 headings , in conjunction
with interpretive mathematical models  in current use:
(i) Multi-Agents
(ii) Causal Chains
(iii) Feedback Loops
(iv) Self-generating motions: Vector Fields
Multi-Agents
These are entities which, depending upon their use or
context, can serve as operators, functions, vectors  or scalars. The
distinction between ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ thereby becomes blurred,
and may even disappear altogether :
Once again it is quantum theory that gives us the richest selection
of examples: the “pure state” vector ψ  , which is both a function
in its own right, the argument   of the set of observable operators ,
and a tool   for calculating eigenvalues , can also be interpreted as
an operator   in its own right,
namely the corresponding projection operator  ψP   The action
of this operator on its set of eigen-vectors yields their probabilities:
ci
2 =< ψ i |Pψ ψ i >
A rather different example of a multi-agent is the speed of
light , c, in Special Relativity .  It is first and foremost a scalar, a
universal constant of the natural world, which can and has been
measured to many places. This makes it an entity in the intrinsic
structure.
Yet in the statements of the  theory of special relativity, it
actually functions as an indeterminate    , essentially a letter
expressing the ratio of the universal unit of time with that of
length. In this form it has no specific value but rather serves a
function, that of expressing the  combination rules for the agents
of  special relativity, in particular the identities of the Lorentz
group. . In this capacity it belongs to the extrinsic structure.
In the same way, the number  “1” carries  the dual function
of being the measure of a single unit of some magnitude, together
with that of the   idea of “identity” in the abstract theory of
groups.
Causal Chains
Loosely speaking, a Causal Chain looks like this: An initial
cause C1  , acts on a medium M1 to produce an effect E1  . (
Example: A potter acts on clay to produce a vase ) . By acting on
yet another medium M2  , E1 becomes C2  : the change of context
has turned an effect into a cause.
( The vase is taken to market and is the cause of the potter’s
receiving a good sum of money. ) . This in turn produces an effect
E2  ( The money received from the sale) . In yet another context M
3 , E2   becomes a cause C3 , producing an effect E3 . ( The potter
uses the money to dine in restaurants and grows fat) .....
Schematically:
potter
↓→ vase
clay ↓→ money
market ↓→ obesity...etc.
food
The basic unit in this process may be written:
Ck =
Ek−1
↓
Mk−1








→ Ek
The “effect” does not turn into a “cause” until there is a
substrate or domain on which it acts in a natural fashion to
produce another effect.
Analytically one pictures a class of functions F = { fα } , acting on a
set of domains ∆ = { Dα  } to produce objects in a set of ranges {
Rα } , which are either scalars or functions, depending on the
domains to which they are applied.
Let Mk   be the space of all mxn rectangular matrices with
real or complex  entries, such that m , n ≤  k . If A , B e Mk  ,
define an “action” of A onto B by 
A↑ B ≡ BAT
 , when this
matrix multiplication is defined. Symbolically,
[m × n]↑ [m × j] = [ j × n]  . Therefore , actions are possible only
between matrices of equal horizontal length, producing another
matrix which serves both as a “scalar” and as another “function”.
The “causal chains” described above can therefore be modeled
somewhat as follows by  sequences of matrices in  Mk   :
[m0 ×m1]↑ [m0 ×m2 ]↑ [m1 ×m3]↑ [m2 ×m4]....
C1 M1 M2 M3
E1 = (C1↑M1) = C2
E2 = (C2 ↑M2 ) = C3
...........
Ek = (Ck ↑Mk ) = Ck+1
Every matrix except the first is a “medium”. The accumulated
products are the “effects” which, acting on the next medium,
becomes a “cause” , etc...
Feedback
In the example of the potter and the vase one can imagine
that, after the potter has sold the vase, he uses the money to buy
more clay to make another vase. Such a “causal coupling” is
usually combined with the increase in absolute value of some
magnitude, producing the phenomena of positive and negative
feedback.
In a typical scenario in the theory of dynamical systems,
there is a fixed function,  for example Φ(z) = λz(1− z)  . Any of
its arguments ω  , can be considered to be the “cause” of the value
ω’ = φ (ω) . In this interpretation the complex number ω  “acts on”
the medium,  the fixed function  φ  .
Vector Fields
Let v|x = ξi
i=1
n
∑ ∂ ∂xi  be a vector field defined over an n-
dimensional manifold M. The field generates a flow Ψ(ε, x)  from
any starting point x on the surface. The fundamental properties of
this flow are:
(1)Ψ(ε,Ψ(δ , x)) = Ψ(ε + δ , x)
(2)Ψ(0, x) = x
(3)
dΨ(ε, x)
dε |ε=0
= v|x
Identifying the parameter  ε  with time, the above list of
properties states that in some fashion, the flow acts on itself  . If
one allows that the increase in elapsed time from any given
starting point is an irreversible process , ( It is a misnomer to say
that “time moves”, any more than “space moves”. However
systems “move through space”, and that motion is never
instantaneous,  but always a ‘flow’ through time. ) , it follows that
ε must increase, in elapsed time   to a quantity  ε + δ , which can
be interpreted as the action of the flow Ψ(δ , x)   on   the flow
Ψ(ε, x)  .
Other interpretations of the statement “Every effect is also a
cause” can be advanced, but these suffice for the purposes of
illustration.
 Example II
Additivity
“Causal additivity” has three aspects, as depicted in the
following instances:
(1) Two ounces of water combine with three
ounces of water to give five ounces of water. ( The algebra of
magnitudes)
(2) A 5-pound brick together with another 5-
pound brick gives two 5-pound bricks, not one 10-pound brick. (
The algebra of sets )
(3)  A 220 Hertz pitch P1 of amplitude A ,  played
simultaneously with  a 330 Hertz pitch P2 of amplitude B,
produces a sound in which both pitches maintain their
independence, the amplitude of which  is a highly non-linear
function of A , B  , P1 and  P2  . (Superposition principles)
As we will be making frequent reference to this last example
we  will examine it in more detail:
The amplitude of a sound wave is not as simple a notion as
one has been misled to imagine in generic education. At one
extreme, any  extremal critical point  on the wave shape is an
amplitude. The habit of designating the maximum  of the absolute
value of the sound pressure as “the amplitude” relies on the
assumption that the sound wave is periodic, the  period being  so
minuscule that variations in the amplitude can be ignored.
Consider two pure tones:
φ1 = Asinω1t
φ2 = Bsinω2t
These are ‘coupled’ to produce a wave shape:
ψ1 = Asinω1t + Bsinω2t
The amplitudes are at the critical points. Setting the
derivative to 0, we find that these are at times
cosω2t
cosω1t
= −Aω1 Bω2
(1) The two frequencies are commensurable. Then the wave
shape is periodic. Making the additional assumption that the
period is so short enough that  the amplitudes at the various
critical points can’t be distinguished. We let  µ   stand for a time at
which the absolute value of ψ   attains its global maximum,  C .
The calculation is straightforward and one obtains:
C2 =
ABω2 sinω1µ + B2ω22 − A2ω12 cos2ω1µ
Bω2
(2) If on the other hand, the period is very long, then the
amplitude will appear to ‘fluctuate’ between a set of eigenvalues.
The phenomenon is so far from being additive that the “sum” of
the amplitudes A and B has generated not one, but an entire set
of amplitudes
(3) If ω1 and ω2 are not commensurable, then the wave
shape is not periodic but almost periodic. Then any number of
possibilities may present themselves. The expression for C gives an
absolute bound for the greatest possible amplitude, but the actual
effect of the sound on a listener may differ greatly as a function of
the two ratios A/B and   ω1 / ω2    .
We now return to an examination of the 3 categories of
additive phenomena:
(i ) Magnitude Algebras .
Quantitative Addition :
 Let us start with 3 glasses of water. We have no way of
measuring the volumes of water, but we know that glass G3 is so
large that it can hold all the water from G1 and G2 combined. Let
these amounts be M1 , M2 and M3 respectively. The extrinsic
structure of the Causal Algebra C , for magnitudes  has no
numbers, but it does have order relations, and operations + and -
(a) It is possible to set M1 , M2 and M3 in increasing
order, with
M1 ≤ M2 <  M3
(b)    M3 = M1 + M2
(c) If  water in G3 is now poured back into G1 until it
is full, the remainder can be poured back into G2 until it is full.
This is what is meant by an additive magnitude, and we can write
M1 =  M3 - M2 , and
 M2 = M3  - M1 .
An essential feature of the notion of a ‘magnitude’ ,  is that
the different parts of the water, from the viewpoint of the
magnitude algebra, are indistinguishable.
If we take the glass G3 and, prior to pouring it back into G1
and G2  , we shake it vigorously, this will have no effect on the
result. We therefore define Magnitude as a kind of space of
indistinguishable entities, on which it is possible to place an
additive measure.
II. Concatenation Algebras. Set Theory :
Sets, as per Zermelo -Fraenkel, allow for no confusion
or overlap in their elements. Two bricks remain two bricks, no
matter what their weight is. 2 green bricks, 3 green bricks and an
orange brick cannot be recombined ( without pulverization or
recasting, which are not set theoretic operations ! ) into 3 green
bricks, 2 orange bricks and a red brick.
If an order-type be associated with a set, then one has the
more familiar idea of a concatenation: a sequence of bricks laid out
in a row, or a set of beads producing a pattern, tiling, etc.
The extrinsic structure of a concatenation algebra will contain
the operations of union, intersection, complement, and so forth.
More generally, one can speak of Boolean lattices as extrinsic
structures.
The intrinsic structure may contain selection rules for
choosing subsets (  the elements of the power set ) , or patterns
and order relations between the various elements of the set.
It is these subtle differences between Point Set Topology
and Measure Theory , between additive algebras of type II and
those of type I, which produce the paradoxes and pathologies of
Lesbesgue Measure and Lesbesgue Integration: Baire Sets, non-
Measurable Sets, the Tarski sphere construction, non-standard
arithmetics and even the Continuum Hypothesis .
III. Superposition Principles:
Superposition combines “ measure and set inclusion “ ,
with
“ magnitude and Cartesian product”  : superpositions are sums
which can be both decomposed back into their prime components
while working as additive magnitudes. To do this  a background
of  irreducible components needs to be given in advance. For
example, the number “2” , as magnitude   , is a prime in the ring Z
of  integers, though composite in the ring Z(i) . As a measure   the
value “2” is unaffected by its decomposition over Euclidean rings :
2 = 1 + 1 in all of them.
The situation is similar with respect to the wave functions of
Quantum Theory, and caution is advised with speaking of “the
superposition principle” without specifying the context in which
it is operative. Recalling our previous example,
ψ = Asinω1t + Bsinω2t
To effect a unique decomposition of this shape into component
functions,
φ1 = Asinω1t, φ2 = Bsinω2t   , one has to specify the
orthonormal basis relative to which there decomposition is being
made. If, for example, ω1 and ω2 are incommensurable ,   ω1/ω2      
= irrational , one can express
( at least within a finite time frame) the component functions as
sinω1t = rne(in)t
−∞
∞
∑
sinω2t = sne(in)t
−∞
∞
∑ , and
ψ = (Arn + Bsn )e(in)t
−∞
∞
∑
Expressed against this set of basis vectors, ψ   can be written
as the sum of two orthogonal functions in an endless number of
ways. If one knows  that the  eigen-frequencies of y are ω1 and ω2
, one can apply the theory of almost-periodic functions to derive φ1
and φ2 .
The extrinsic structure of aSuperposition Causal Algebra   (
SCA)  precedes looks something like this:
(1) One has  a pre-established  collection  of irreducible
components , such as primes, basis vectors, building blocks ,
generating  a vector space over a ring , field , algebra, etc.
(2) The agents of the SCA are finite or infinite “sums” of
these components, weighted by their coefficients. The word sum
is used in
two senses  :
(i) As the Cartesian product, ( vectorial sum )  of
the distinctive components. As in the way sets are augmented by
the operation of union , these retain their identity and may be
retrieved by a process which, very generally, may be called “co-
addition”, or “co-multiplication”
(ii ) As an algebraic sum obtained by “evaluating” the
components in the ring of coefficients  at some point in space-time
and thereby forming an infinite series over that ring, with
appropriate criteria for convergence, etc.
In the situation presented by the  quantum theory  the wave
function ψ  is both a vector and a magnitude. “Decomposing” the
vector into unique components requires the presence of an operator
which is relevant to the quantity  , possessing  a complete set of
eigenfunctions that form the basis of the closed linear manifold
which is the natural setting,  ( the background of natural
phenomena)  for ψ  .
What do we mean by a “relevant operator”?  If the operator K
represents electron spin , and our particle isn’t an electron, or
doesn’t have the set of internal freedoms known as spin, then the
“action” of K on ψ   is without meaning.
However, associated with ψ   is a magnitude , or “norm”,
given by
< ψ ,ψ >= ψ*ψdx3V∫  . This quantity, like the water  shaken in
the glass is without distinguishable parts:  It cannot be
“decomposed” in the absence of a relevant operator.
Many examples from daily life come readily to mind. The
evaluation process corresponds to an “unfaithful” transformation,
reducing  a collection of distinguished components to an
undifferentiated magnitude, rather analogous to the  way in
which a Black Hole transforms all the different kinds of matter
and energy entering it to a uniform “substance”
( if that is the appropriate word ).  Example : In calculating
income tax, one translates all of one’s assets into  monetary
equivalents. “Money” then operates like an undifferentiated
“magnitude” under the extrinsic rules of a magnitude algebra. It is
because of this useful property that the detestable institution of
money will no doubt always be with us.
EXAMPLE 3: Strict Determinism
The first two examples have dealt with the extrinsic
structures of certain standard causal algebras. The following
assertion  is the victor in the popularity contest for intrinsic causal
postulates:
 “ If S is a state variable describing the
behavior of an isolated  system K , then all past
and future values of S may be computed from the
values of the magnitudes in S  and  all  their  time
derivatives ,  at any   instant of time. ”
The  statement says nothing about the combination rules for
its agents of a causal algebra . What it does mandate is  a set of
procedures  for extracting predictions from the range of
magnitudes in its representation spaces  at an arbitrary  time t.  It
is for this reason that  the normal assumption in most of physics is
that the intrinsic structure of such causal algebras contain nothing
but analytic functions,  representable as a Taylor Series of some
non-vanishing radius of convergence. Simply : the entire history
of an analytic function may be computed from information  about
its derivatives at any given instant.
It may not always be the case that every function in such
algebras  is composable with every other function. Rules that
restrict permissible combinations create  what’s sometimes  a
“groupoid” , though it is high time mathematical terminology
revealed more imagination.
 However such structures are natural to physics. An
electromagnetic field E  “acts on” a positively or negatively
charged particle yet has no effect on a neutral particle such as a
neutron N . As particles themselves may be treated as fields, the
action of field E on field N may be deemed impermissible. It is
somehow the case that , with respect to all forces except
gravitation, individual bits of matter have the freedom to decide
which forces they care to be subjected to!
If P signifies the “particle”, σ    the “parity of charge”  ( = -1,
0, 1)  , and    
r
v  its position vector then, symbolically
E(Ps;rv ) = σ
r
u +
r
v  , 
r
u   being the displacement .   
EXAMPLE 4:
Invariance Under Time Translation
Let  UA  be  a causal algebra obedient to a
postulate of  time translational invariance. If F is any agent of  UA
,  then
        ∀F∀t0(F(t)∈U
A → f (t ± t0 )∈U)
 This is the condition of temporal independence. It is not
applicable in any space-time region of our universe  in which the
Hubble expansion, or  conscious awareness play   a significant role
in  events. Its normal domain of application is to small, isolated
parts of the cosmos to which we give the suggestive name of
“laboratories”. Thermodynamic dissipation is  assumed to move in
the same arrow of time; according to Stephen Hawking, this
process sets the direction for the former two. Entropy increase
does retain a “time invariance” not present in the others , because
one is free to begin a dissipative thermal process at any arbitrary
point of space-time .
The condition of temporal invariance is unusual in that it is
both an extrinsic rule of combination for the agents of  UA  , yet
can also be employed in the intrinsic extraction of predictive
information from particular situations.   Thus, the integral:
σ(t ) = w(s − t ) f (s)dst0
∞∫  has a dual interpretation as
either
(i) A calculation made along the path of f for all time
beyond the present, or:
(ii) An integration across a transverse cross-section of
the family of functions { ft (s) } = { f(t+s ) }  at the  instant  t  ,
weighted by the function w. In the first case, σ  is a convolution
of two vectors “w” and “f “ . In the second case, w is a probability
density.
IIIIIIIIIIII
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In the elucidation of both  extrinsic and intrinsic
structures one is  guided by certain “criteria of reality” akin to
those of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, themselves a simple
application of Ockham’s Razor to the quantum domain.
( Ea ) : Every composition rule of the extrinsic structure
should correspond to invariant features of the observed universe.
( Eb )  : Every invariant feature of the observed
universe should find a representation in the agents and
combination rules of the extrinsic structure
( I a ) : Every algorithm  of the intrinsic structure should
correspond to some empirically derived law of nature, (  Hooke’s
Law, the Navier-Stokes equation, Avogadro’s Law, etc. )
( I b )  : The mathematical form of every empirical law
of  the observed universe of the science under consideration
should be present  in the intrinsic structure of the causal algebra.
In the ideal case every entity that goes into the
establishment of a causal algebra : agents, extrinsic and intrinsic
structures, representation spaces and data of observation will
correspond to some feature of what one might call the
“description”: the world picture prior to interpretation shared in
the understanding of all persons working in the particular field. It
would be assumed, for example, that persons working in Zoology
would agree that there exist animals, human, primates, birds,
snakes and so forth. The evolutionary scenarios and hereditary
trees that hypothetically unify this heterogeneous collection of
random facts would belong to the causal algebra: ideally every tree
would correspond to some feature of the living kingdom;  to every
known feature of that kingdom there would correspond an entity
in the causal algebra.
In the best of situations  the representation is a faithful
isomorphism. In real scientific practice  one is generally satisfied
with much less: in advancing a particular science one doesn’t wait
for its principles to be identified in advance.  Investigators are
usually quite satisfied to have  a serviceable homomorphism:
everything in the model refers to something in the description,
though the reverse may not be true.
Even this is not always possible,  and in many
instances one works with a “best approximation”. Recall the cliché
associated with quantum electrodynamics: “The best theory we
have.” This is quite acceptable provided one is given in  advance
some  purposes to which the theory will be applied.
The 3 Temporal Modes
Every interpretation of the notion of causation must consider
its application with respective to the 3 temporal categories of
present, future  and past . These correspond to the scientific
procedures of:
(I) Description
(II) Prediction
(III) Back-reconstruction
Of course any particular  science will  specialize in one or
more of these modes , and we can speak of  the “Predictive
Sciences” ( Physics, Chemistry ) , “Descriptive Sciences”   (
Journalism or Photography  which can be considered ‘sciences of
the present’ ) , and “Back Reconstructive Sciences” such as History
and Geology. However no science is really  comprehensive
without orienting itself relative to all 3 temporal categories.
Our concerns in this essay  begin at the place after most of
these things have been established as pre-requisites. The correct
formulation  of causal assumptions  often serves as merely the
starting point of irresolvable  controversies central to  a particular
science. Consider the situation in geology:  largely a back-
reconstructive science, historically its vision has been obstructed
by an antinomy, that of Uniformitarian versus Catastrophist
interpretations of the origins of features of the earth’s topography.
There are so many situations for which an inevitable logic appears
to lead to either catastrophist and uniformitarian scenarios
demonstrates that the basic concepts  of causation are never self
evident, and that several   non-compatible causal descriptions , (
along with their  corresponding algebraic structures ) can be
advanced.
“Uniformitarianism” and “catastrophism” are irreconcilable
causal mechanisms. A Uniformitarian maintains that every feature
of the earth’s past can be understood by appeal to processes at
work on the earth as it is today. A Catastrophist will stress the
existence of present features which oblige one to envisage  past
processes of which there no traces, or very few, in  today’s world.
This kind of trade-off is intrinsic to any back-reconstructive
science. For, where can we turn to for our understanding of the
past, if not the present? Yet, if back-reconstruction suggests
formative processes which are not in existence now, how does one
deal with the requirement of all science that explanations be
testable against experience? It comes as no surprise to see the same
debate resurfacing with respect to the cosmic inflation scenarios of
Alan Guth and others, that postulate the past existence of a
“Higgs scalar field” in the first micro-second of the Big Bang,
which has since disappeared “ leaving not a jot behind”.
Consider the distinctive character of the kinds of differential
equations one might develop to model uniformitarian versus
catastrophist approaches.  The Uniformitarian might begin by
making an inventory of all terrestrial processes and forces,
convection, tectonic plate movements, volcanic activity, erosion,
and so forth, that start juggling permutations and couplings of
these to see how well they can reproduce the world around us.
The Catastrophist might begin with a catalogue of all conceivable
processes, governed say by every imaginable combination of
differential forms expressed as Hamiltonians, to see if they
produce better models. To take a well-known example, there is the
famous capsizing
catastrophe of Hugh Auchincloss:
“ In a series of broadsides circulated
to congressmen, government leaders,
scientists, and journalists over half a
century, as well as in a book published at
his own expense, Brown argued that the
Earth capsizes at intervals of about 8000
years, each time wiping out whatever
civilization has managed to emerge. The
next one, he says, is overdue, and the
Eskimos may be among the few
survivors, because the polar areas will be
the least subjected to catastrophic water
action.”
(Walter Sullivan, “ Continents in Motion”, pg. 22, see
Bibliography )
One must therefore permit a considerable amount of leeway
in the formation of the Extrinsic Structure of a causal algebra . The
Intrinsic Structure is easier to deal with:  any set of practical or
operational  formulae that  produce sufficiently close a correlation
to the data are admissable.
Modal Predicates
For the purposes of this essay,  the  possible   is defined as
the collection of permissible universes induced by the action of
the agents of the causal algebra on the representation spaces. The
actual   is a special subspace of this, in which all unbound
variables of the agents are replaced by their domain specifications
in the raw database of observations.
In a departure from the customary employment of the term, the
impossible  is taken to mean the set of all extensions of   
CAwhich can be expressed in its language ,  but lie outside the
world description, or actual .   Anything  else  will be labeled
inconceivable   .
For example: The Relativity Principle states that no material
particle can attain , in any reference frame, the speed of light, c .
One may easily construct “extensions” of relativity in which c is
given a value larger than  299,729 km./sec. “Relativistic possibility”
is that theory which replaces the specific value of light in our
universe with an indeterminate constant, c, whereas “relativistic
actuality” replaces c by the experimentally obtained value.
One might then identify the “inconceivable” ( vis-a-vis
relativity)  as a universe in which there is no radiation.  “
impossibility “  and
“ inconceivability” are therefore relative labels .
This picture may not satisfy the rigorous standards of
sophisticated philosophers of science; nor am I totally satisfied
with it myself.  We are content if we can provide a fresh insight
into the  procedural assumptions which underlie scientific practice,
assumptions  all too often taken for granted and which merit
further scrutiny.
Modal Calculi
We describe   3 symbolic calculi for representing the notions
of possibility, necessity, actuality, knowability, etc. These are very
tentative, and no axiomatic development from first principles is
presented at this point. These formalisms will be employed in
various places in this essay, as needed:
I. Possibility versus Necessity
(a)   (q
p → p)    “ It is possible that q implies p” . The
following formation is taken to be a tautology:
(p→ q)→ (q p → p)
“ p implies q ”  implies that “ “q implies p”  is possible “ .
(b) We also want p⇒ q   “ p necessarily   implies q”  . This
states that if p exists, then q must exist. It does not mean that p
need exist. In other words, this notation is a short hand for
∃p⇒∃q  . The way in which these are used is best illustrated by
examples.
(1) Apple trees cause apples. However, a particular apple tree
may be infertile and not produce any apples. However : if I hold
an apple in my  hand, I know for a certainty   that there must
have been a tree that produced it .  So, using the above  notation,
one  has:
(apple⇒ tree)
but
(tree p → apple)
Clearly  there are many situations in which the effect
necessarily implies the cause but not the reverse. Generalizing,
one recognizes 4 distinct situations:
(1) Apples necessarily   imply apple trees,  the converse is
possible only:
(Effect⇒ Cause) but
→ (Cause p → Effect)
(2) A living body necessarily   implies a future corpse . A
dead carcass necessarily   implies the former  existence  of a living
body. 5  (p⇔ q)
(3) A field strewn with corpses  implies  that there may   
have been a massacre, but a massacre implies there must be dead
bodies.
                                    
5 Until such time as we are able to combine soups of DNA and other molecules  to exactly
reconstruct the corpse of an animal !
(Cause⇒ Effect) but
→ (Effect p → Cause)
(4) Education may produce wisdom; wisdom may have come
from education.
(Cause p → Effect) and
→ (Effect p → Cause)
(2) is roughly  equivalent to “necessary and sufficient” in
mathematics. The  essential paradox associated with the notion of
past time,  is that only the past is certain, cannot be known only
reconstructed. Lets give labels to these things:
(1) Back - reconstruction
(2) Formal equivalence
(3) Determinism
(4)  Correlation.
 II. The Knowable, the Unknowable and the
Known
The situations peculiar to “The New Physics” ( the
expression of A. d’Abro) require us to spend much of our time
explaining or justifying the notion of the  “possible but
unknowable”. This  idea is foreign to  classical science.
(a) Consider Proposition P1 :  X is unknowable and X --> Y   .
Question: Is this proposition true or false?
Example: Let X  be “ The evidence  burned in the fireplace
proves Q’s  guilt   ” .  Let Y   be   “ There are 24 hours in a day.  ”
Aristotelian material implication of Aristotelian logic states that the
truth of Y is sufficient to determine the truth of P1 .  However,
what if Y is false?  Examples
(i) “Since the evidence that was burned in the fireplace
proves the guilt of Q,  Q is not guilty . “
(ii) “Since the evidence that was burned in the fireplace
proves the guilt of Q,  Q is guilty.”
By material implication , and assuming that Q is   guilty, which
one of these statements is true? Both? Neither? One or the other?
It impresses me that since X is unknowable, we must deem
both (i) and (ii) formally unknowable  .
Proposition P2 : “ Q’s guilt proves that the evidence burned
in the fireplace proves the guilt of Q. “ This is obviously false, as is
“ Q’s innocence proves that the evidence
burned in the fireplace proves the guilt of Q. “
The calculus of unknowables therefore seems to indicate that
any true or false statement can imply an unknowable statement,
but that no unknowable statement can imply either a true or a
false statement. If both X and Y are unknowable, we must value
the whole statement “unknowable” even those X and Y may be
identical! Examples:
 A. “ ‘The first name of the unknown soldier is Jack’ implies that
his first name has four letters.”
B. “ ‘The evidence burned in the fireplace proved the guilt of Q
implies that the evidence in the fireplace proved the guilt of Q.”
Let T = true , F = false , U = unknowable.
P ---> Q
P
\
Q
T F U
T
T F T
F T T T
U
F F U
Example  2 :  This is based on the fact that, according to
Special Relativity, if a light beam is sent from  earth at time t=0 ,  is
bounced off a distant star about which we know nothing, and
returns to earth at time t = T ,then it is intrinsically impossible to
know the time at which the beam hit the surface of the star.
 “The time on a clock on earth,  at which a
light beam hit a distant star, exists.”
This is very   controversial, because the epistemology of
relativity really seems to imply  that this “time” does not exist ,
since there is no way to know it.
Example  3 :
“The individual spins of a pair of entangled electrons exist.”
Another extremely controversial statement.
Example 4 :
“  The only evidence for Q’s guilt was burnt in the fireplace. 
However  either Q’s guilt exists or Q’s innocence exist, but not
both “
One can construct a consistent logic in which 4  is false.
Lets introduce a few more predicates. The first is the conventional
“existence” predicate :  ∃A  , “A exists.”
The second predicate we will designate by “ ∑ :
“ ∑T “ means  There exists a way of measuring T  .
What are the truth values of these in combination? I send a
light beam out to a distant star about which I know nothing. I
send this out at 12 noon; it bounces off the star and returns to me
at 6 PM. By relativity the time when it bounced off the star is
intrinsically unknowable.  Consider the following combinations:
(1)    ∃A“There exists a time at which the light beam
bounced off the star.”
(2) ¬Σ∃T   “ We cannot measure this existent time.”  Since
there is no way to determine (1) , the question arises, does (2)
have any meaning ? (3) ¬ΣT   “T can’t be measured.”
The problem is that before relativity, Kantian and other
systems of causation maintained that all events, measurable or not,
gave rise to a trail of indirect effects that, sooner or later would
become known. Just before his death, Q might write off a
confession and send it to the newspapers. An eye-witness to the
crime may surface 20 years later. etc. Even if these things did not
happen, the possibility that they might happen was always open.
But relativistic epistemology opened the door to events that were
intrinsically unknowable because of the structure of physical theory
.  This is a totally new phenomenon. The other example I gave, of
entangled electrons, is not so unusual, for one can argue that the
“individual identity” of the electrons is just a fiction. However,
when causation itself is propagated at a finite speed, one
generates paradoxes that have never before been seen.
(4) P:(∃T ∧¬ΣT )→#T =U  , where #T stands for the
‘truth value of T’ ( true, false, unknowable) . Such entities will be
deemed ‘intrinsically unknowable’ .
We introduce an example from psychology: For a great many
traits , it is a fact that by knowing of them  we automatically
change them . Therefore we can never know our present state but
only a past one: if I’m killing myself because I drink contaminated
water , then I can be called a “self-destructive human being”. But
the moment I learn that this activity is destroying me, I stop it.
Learning that I am a self-destructive human being means that I am
no longer such.
Schematically “P exists and P is unknown. When P  becomes
known, it ceases to exist.” In the calculus we’ve been developing,
one has:
∃P→ (#P ="U")
(#P ≠"U")→ ¬∃P
III. The Possible and the Conceivable
In this context, “possibility”  relates only to entities
which may be freely combined in thought experiments, or
systems in isolation, that are not prohibited by the restrictions on
causation. We notate  the modal quantifier “P is possible” as
>P<  . This means :  P is an element of the conceptual universe ( or
collection of universes) constructible from the agents and rules of
the causal algebra CA  .
Example: Consider the Uniformitarian Postulate for Geology
: “Every feature of the Earth’s past can be explained by
processes at work in the Earth as it is today. “
Owing to the astronomical increase in astronomical
knowledge in the modern world, the scope of geology is extended
to include any sort of rock in the universe, notably the planets,
moons and asteroids in the solar system, etc.
Relative to this principle, what is “possible” and what isn’t?
(1) The complete melting away of the ice caps is   possible,
since we can explain that by the melting, even the disappearance,
of glaciers in our own day. This despite the fact that history has
never recorded the disappearance of the ice caps.
(2) Brown’s hypothesis of spontaneous capsizings, whereby
the poles are flipped every 8,000 years is “not possible”. However,
if it can be given a mechanism other than invisible blue devils at
the earth’s core, or a fifth fundamental force of nature, etc., it may
be deemed “conceivable”
Suppose we use the symbol:   UC
A
 to signify the collection
of conceptual universes generated by  CA  . Then >P<  means
that   P∈UCA .
“Not Possibility ” will be given a slightly different definition
from the conventional one , and will be notated > P < . This
means that P is expressible in the language of CA , but not an
element in any of the conceptual universes it generates. The
collection of linguistic   universes generated by CA will be notated
  IC
A.
Therefore:   > P <⇒ P∈ICA ∧ P∉UCA.
Example: “Unicorns” are conceivable  in terms of the
language of Zoology, but are not possible . They have no
relevance to the language or concepts of Geology; we have
another term for that: we say that “unicorns” are not conceivable
in the language of Geology , for which we use the symbol (P)*.
The “impossible” will be taken to be anything that is either not
possible or inconceivable
Simply stated   (P)*⇒ P∉IC
A(⊃ UCA).
The “actuality” quantifier : as defined in this essay  actuality
does not  refer directly to the actual world. To say that “P” is
actual shall mean: P is a calculation from established domains of
inputs into the arguments, functions and agents of   CA  . The
“world of actuality”  , ⊗CA is yet another collection of universes
derivable from the causal algebra   . It contains only descriptions,
not interpretations or laws. These descriptions can then be
compared with the world of observation and experience for the
purposes of falsification and prediction. Symbolically “P is actual”
will be notated #P# ( The “number sign” indicating
“quantification”) .
This is the complete modal calculus for the description of the
algebraic structure of causation. Everything is inclusion, exclusion
and negation; the calculus is a simple form of a Boolean Algebra.
To summarize:
  
⊗CA ⊂ UCA ⊂ ICA
#P#⇒ P∈⊗CA
> P <⇒ P∈UCA
> P <⇒ P∈ICA,P∉UCA
(P)*⇒ P∉ICA
All this is fairly self-evident. One need merely point out that
“not possible” and “impossible” are different categories. The
“impossible” includes the   “not possible” as well as the
“inconceivable”.
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Appendix to Chapter II
Algebraic Causation in Quantum
Theory :
Four Formalisms
I. Heisenberg Formalism
(a) Principles of Causation:
1. Position and Momentum are non-commuting
2. Time and Energy are non-commuting
3. State vectors are time independent
4. Observables are matrix elements of infinite matrices
and vibrate harmonically
5. Nothing exists at the quantum level beyond the
probabilities computable from the action of the observables on the
state vectors
(b)   Agents
1. Hermitian Matrices
2. Unitary Matrices
3. Classical Hamiltonians
4. Vectors
(c) The Extrinsic Structure
(i) Quantization
q↔ x •
p↔ ih∂() ∂x
E↔ ih∂() ∂t
(ii) Superposition
(iii) The algebra of inner products and matrices  in
Hilbert Space
(d) Representation Spaces
(i) Configuration Space
(ii) Momentum Space
(iii) Hilbert Space
(e) The Intrinsic Structure
(i ) ih
dAjk
dt
= ϖAjk
(ii ) ih
dA
dt
= [H,A]
(iii ) ih
dU(Ψ)
dt
= HU(Ψ)
II. Schrödinger Formalism
The key differences of the Heisenberg and Schrödinger formalisms
are
(a) Principles of Causation
* Simultaneous presence of all eigenvalues; wave
equation “smeared” over space
* Observables are time independent
* State vectors are vibrating harmonic oscillators
(b) Extrinsic structure
* Observables are linear differential forms
(c) Representation Spaces
* The evolution of the state vector is analogous to
that of the path of  light ray in Hamiltonian phase space
(d) Intrinsic Structure
ih
∂ψ
∂t
= − h
2
2m
∇2ψ +Vψ
3. Dirac Formalism
The Dirac Formalism does not differ conceptually from
the others, but introduces an intelligent notation in the extrinsic
structure which allows one to work with it more effective
(c) Extrinsic Structure
Bras − n
Kets − m
Scalars: n m
Operators: m n
Tensors: a b
4. von Neumann Formalism
(a) Principles of Causation
(1) Existence of Sharp Values of Eigenvalues even
when unobserved
(2) Collapse of the Wave Packet on Observation
(b) Agents
Integral Linear Transformations  as Observables
Projection Operators  as states
(c) Extrinsic Structure
(1 ) von Neumann Algebras
(d) Intrinsic Structure
Stieljes Integrals
The Trace Formula
Prob.() = Tr.(Pψ • PW )  (check this in Redhead)
The Statistical Operator
W = ciP∆ψ i∑  for mixtures
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II. The Lagrange/Hamilton Paradigm
(a) Unpacking the Instant:  The Null Set
as Infinite Well of Possibility.
The  instant   is an abstraction which, as with most  useful
notions of science, corresponds to nothing in the phenomenal
world.  That the nexus of change is always instantaneous  is a
basic assumption of the physical sciences. In fact, an instant   in
the trajectory of a monotonic state variable S(t)  is best understood
as the length of time between acquisition of a particular  value v,
and its infinitesimal passage to the  value v + dv .
In and of itself an instant is  null and void. Nothing
‘happens’ within the confines of the instant: indeed, to speak of
events happening ‘inside’ the instant is deemed  a violation of
language . Yet classical physics  ascribes an enormous content to
the instant. There , and in hidden variables formulations and
semi-classical limits of quantum theory, the entire history, the so
called  world line of a system K  in isolation is considered to be
present in the configuration of K at any arbitrarily selected instant.
We call this The Lagrange/Hamilton Paradigm .
Gottfried Leibniz and Immanuel Kant envisaged an extreme
form of the Lagrange/Hamilton paradigm, one in which  the entire
cosmos, from inception to extinction, is entirely present at every
point of space-time, in every instant of every location. The
mirroring of the Macrocosm in the Microcosm, the arbitrarily great
in the vanishingly small, is universally present.
Such a conception is theoretically testable: take an arbitrarily
small region ρ  around some location, arbitrarily chosen, and
explore how much of science can be deduced from the information
available in ρ  .
ρImpinging 
Universe
Without arguing either the pros or the cons of this
conception we would merely remark that it corresponds to what
science in fact labors to accomplish. Relative to the known or
knowable universe, the earth is a negligible speck. Relative to the
vast reaches of time, ( back to the Big Bang or the foreseeable
future), the entire history of the human race is but an instant. Yet,
it is from the information available here that we endeavour to
determine all else that is happening everywhere.
The major difficulty with the Leibniz/Kant paradigm is that
it leaves no room for thought experiments. Here indeed we are
touching upon an irreducible contradiction within classical
physics. On the one hand: we like to imagine that Universe so acts
on  Earth that, from this earthbound prison we can divine the
universal laws.
On the other hand: it is clear that science is unworkable, if
not inconceivable, without allowing for the possibilities of the
thought experiment  and the system in isolation . Both of these
require that, by an act of mental visualization one can escape all
biasing local conditions    , and place our laboratories in
hypothetically ideal regions of space purified of all alien
influences: gravity-free flat regions of space-time; perfect black
boxes impervious to external fields; ideal ‘Schrödinger cats’ which
have no way of letting the world know if they are alive or dead;
containment vessels in which all the products of any reaction may
be swept up to demonstrate the conservation of matter and
energy.....
Another implication of the Leibniz/Kant paradigm is that
every particle feels every force. There are no neutral particles, no
neutrons. Both the strong and the weak nuclear forces are really
coupled to infinity, although the coupling be so weak that we’ll
never be able to detect it. Note that this is not so far off from
Richard Feynman’s stance in Quantum Electrodynamics: the
manifested paths of all moving entities, including  photons, are
actually cancellations of the amplitudes of all possible paths.
Thereby all neutrality is in effect cancellation  ; anything that can
happen does, though almost all of it with vanishing probability.
We have inadvertently put our finger on the essential
distinction between the Lagrange/Hamilton paradigm and the
Leibniz/Kant paradigm. Lagrangian mechanics, as enriched to its
modern form by William Rowan Hamilton, rests securely on the
notion of the system in isolation. The substance  of a Lagrangian
Configuration Space of 3N dimensions, ( where each particle is
represented by 3 coordinate axes corresponding to the x,y,z
coordinates in physical space) is such that , excepting only these N
points, the rest of the  universe  is excluded in advance.  The
Lagrangian differential form L = U - V    embodies the full
teleology, the initial conditions, the motor of time evolution, and
the ultimate fate of any dynamical system under its command.
The situation does not change materially when
Configuration Space is enlarged to Hamilton’s Phase Space by the
introduction of new variables, the generalized momenta, which
are generated directly out of the Lagrangian through the
substitutions
pi =
∂L
∂ qi
•
The Hamiltonian world-line moves, in a manner analogous to a
sound wave through an incompressible fluid, from time -  ∞ to
time +  ∞     , as if Phase Space were itself the sensorium of
experience, a universe complete and closed on itself that is never
intended to hook up with processes in the real world.
Lagrange/Hamilton systems are clocks; their very conception
in an agreement with the notions of a clockwork universe so dear
to the rationalists of the 18th century. Unlike terrestrial clocks,
they cannot be influenced by tides, sunspots, cosmic rays,
mechanical failures, entropy, expansions, inflations, and so on. Of
course it is true that the variability of the potential V  , itself
derivable from a gradient that is distributed over space, does
represent , albeit in a very simplified or reduced fashion, the
influence of the rest of the universe on the system of N particles.
However, in the full Leibniz/Kant paradigm, it is not only
the universe which affects the system, but the system with also
influences the rest of the universe, therefore also changes the
potential. In addition, the universe is constantly interacting on
itself, which means that the value of V  at every point must be a
function of the value of V  at all other points.
Furthermore: given that Hamiltonian systems are, in general,
not only C∞   but analytic - otherwise stated, that the fibration of
Phase Space
by the bundle of world-lines determined by all possible initial
conditions at a moment t = 0 , is holomorphic - it follows that
knowledge of all time derivatives at that initial instant is sufficient
to determine all of its trajectories through all of time. Once again, a
Hamiltonian system figures as a closed universe, Phase Space as a
mental construct.
We will be looking at various alternative models of the
Lagrange/Hamilton paradigm in the following pages. Gottfried
Wilhelm von Leibniz himself. ( “Leibniz” G. MacDonald Ross,
Oxford UP 1984 pgs. 88-100)  constructed an algebraic model for
Leibniz/Kant causation . The monads, present at every point of
space, each containing others in a descending chain, are essentially
observers, spectators for the entire cosmos. In line with his view
that Ultimate Reality consists of the sum total of all existent mental
viewpoints, the cosmos itself is nothing but this infinite
congregation of witnesses. It is their acts of observation that bring
the cosmos into being.
 “In short, there exist only monads,
and monads are nothing other than
actualised sets of perceptions defined by
a particular point of view.”
( Macdonald Ross, pg. 95)
“...It was one of the main theses of his
philosophy that objective truth is the
summation of the different viewpoints of
all individuals .”
(Ibid , pg. 75)
“ We normally understand the world as
consisting of objects of perception
separate from and common to different
perceivers. Leibniz held that such objects
were only mental constructs. “
(Ibid, pg. 90 )
The mathematical tools for constructing models or
realizations of the programme of Leibniz’s Monadology have only
been developed quite recently, in the Fractal Geometries of Benoit
Mandlebrot and his school.
Kantian epistemology, an uniquely brilliant fusion of
psychology with metaphysics, has been under attack from its
inception. Indeed, it is to its credit that so much of it is   falsifiable
and has in fact been falsified. Euclidean Geometry was dethroned
from its exalted station as a synthetic apriori   by Gauss, Bolyai
and Lobatchevsky in the 1870 ’s , ( although all   non-Euclidean
and Riemannian geometries are locally Euclidean . ) Causal
interconnectedness in the literal sense of Leibniz’ monadology
was superceded by Special Relativity: once again, Bell’s Theorems
and the Aspect Experiment have reunited the cosmos via  a
‘correlation’ which , people such as Eberhardt and Stapp assure us
, can’t convey information, yet which nevertheless remains
mysterious.
It should also be noted that Mach’s Principle, which plays a
large role in General Relativity, reaffirms the principle of a totally
interdependent, interconnected universe. The idea is as old as
religion, viz. “the fall of a sparrow...” Neo-Kantians like Ernst
Cassirer and Idealists like Alfred North Whitehead have proposed
various ways of reconciling the Kantian ideal with the new
physics. 
 In theory, neither Quantum Theory nor classical
Thermodynamics violate Leibniz/ Kant causality.  One cannot
deny that physicists in these fields, when setting up experiments
in their laboratories,  would no doubt consider it a hindrance to
have to take  into account the influence of distant stars.
Throughout this essay we will be taking a critical stance towards
metaphysical opinions advanced by scientists concerning the
postulates of causal governance in their disciplines  which  lie too
far afield of real applications in their daily work .
Summarizing: whatever conclusions one may be inclined to
reach about the “Large Scale Structure” of the universe, the
Leibniz/Kant paradigm has little application in either the physical
or the conceptual laboratory. It fails to deliver  with respect to two
crucial requirements:
(1) Thought experiments are indispensable in the sciences.
(2)  Most of the phenomenological world is and will remain
inaccessible to us. 
(b) Difficulties with the Leibniz/ Kant
Paradigm
(i) Cancellation Points:    If one maintains that the history of
the cosmos may be computed from all the information potentially
available at a single point in space-time  one is led to deny the
impossibility of all  symmetries leading to the cancellation of forces
at that or any other point.
 The theoretical possibility of systems in isolation leads one to the
opposite conclusion :  Any compact, isolated system of material
entities must have a force  barycenter, a cancellation point for all
forces  operative  in  the system’s internal dynamics .  We are
indebted to the mathematician René Thom for pointing this out to
us.
To simplify the arguments, let S be a self-contained system
of N particles. Define P as a generalized Phase Space of 9N
coordinates specifying positions, velocities and accelerations in the
3 directions of space x, y, z. Normally one might say that positions
and momenta ought to be sufficient. Let me counter this by
making that observation that even in the simplest and earliest of
dynamical theories, that of Newtonian gravitation, the
accelerations are given first  . Momenta calculated from them
through integration of Newton’s second law and the boundary
conditions. Let the particles have positions, velocities and
accelerations :
X1,X1,
•
X1,
••
Y1,Y1,
•
Y1,
••
Z1,Z1,
•
Z1,
••
X2,X2,
•
X2,
••
.........XN ,XN ,
•
XN
••
, with masses M1 ...MN , charges  e1 ,.....eN  , etc.  Since the
system is bounded within a compact region of space at any given
instant, one can compute the collective moment from any point in
the 9N-dimensional space, given as the inner product of the
coordinates with certain functions of the various masses, charges
,etc.
M =
( f j
x x j + f j
y∑ yj + f jzz j )+ gjx∑ x j+...+ hjx x j+..
••
∑
•
( f j
x+..)+ gj
x+..+ hj
x+..)∑∑∑
It is an elementary result from Affine Geometry, that there
exists a unique barycenter  B = {x j
0, yj
0,z j
0,...}
at which M = 0 .
This demonstrates that there is an instantaneous cancellation
point. If we translation our coordinate system to the point B  by
(1) spatial translation (2) change of reference frame and (3)
introduction of Coriolis-like “fictive” force fields, then we can
place the observer at a point at which, within the closed universe
of the isolated system, all forces and influences are canceled. At
that point the observer can detect no motion through space; his
“lookout” is permanently set at generalized phase coordinates
   
B = (0,0,0,......0,0,0)
9N
1 244 3444
All of this follows simply from the assumption that position,
momentum and force are vector quantities, that is to say, linear
differential operators on a finite Hilbert Space. At such
cancellation points, neither Leibniz/Kant causation nor
Lagrange/Hamilton causation can hold, because one cannot extract
any information out of them. In particular, all individual massive
particles , considered as systems in isolation, must have their own
space/momentum/force barycenter where all the resultant sums of
static, kinematic and dynamical magnitudes are annihilated. One
might try to retain a form of total causal interconnectedness for
most of the universe by treating such cancellation points as
singularities, that is to say as exceptions. However, since each
individual particle has its force barycenter, the point set on which
Kantian causation may be presumed to hold must be in those
domains of space-time in which matter is absent!
For the Leibniz/Kant paradigm to maintain  consistency one
is led to postulate an unbounded universe:  a bounded universe
must have  force barycenters. In our modern cosmological models
these are ready to hand: the  Black Holes which, following the
Hawking-Penrose interpretation, are timeless stable configurations
at  the boundary of space-time. Since Hawking radiation derives
from Quantum Field Theory, which is statistical, it does not enter
into this discussion, which is concerned only with the two basic
paradigms for determinism.
Following the standard cosmological model  a  universal
cancellation point is clearly present at the moment  of the Big
Bang.
Although an unmodified strict Leibniz/Kant paradigm
implies an  unbounded  universe ,  one might still be able, in
theory, to construct systems asymptotically  in isolation. One has
to send them  as far beyond the Hubble horizon as one needs  to
render negligible the forces acting upon them from the local
universe. This construction is frequently employed in  the theory
of Black Holes, where one often speaks of objects or radiation
arriving “from infinity”.
 On the other hand , since the Lagrange/Hamilton formalism
for isolated systems does imply the existence of cancellation
points, one might as well allow for the existence of  indefinitely
large independent regions of space-time   in which all universe
forces are,  ( like the amplitudes of Quantum
Electrodynamics ) ,  canceled.  These would be ideal as regions
into which to “move” or “drop” thought experiments and  systems
in isolation.
The concept of the world-line, the backbone of both classical
and quantum physics, requires a philosophically sound definition
of the system in isolation. Although there is no reason why the
real universe should “make space” for us to put our thought
experiments into it, yet there is something incurably  wrong-
headed about positing one system of causal connections for the
real world, and yet quite another one for thinking about it.
One might call it, “ the fundamental dilemma  of algebraic
causation theory.”
(ii) Singularities
Singularities in the mathematical representations  of
dynamical processes  ( whether in physics or the other sciences),
are classifiable under many species and genera, of which the
following is but a sampling:
(a) One or more of the state variables go to infinity.
These singularities may be “removable” by changing the
representation space. For example, the “line at infinity” bounding
the projective plane can be eliminated by a map that transfers it
homeomorphically onto the equator of the projective, or Kleinian,
sphere.
(b) One or more of the state variables vanish . If a vector
field vanishes at a point there is no way of determining the
direction of a flow from that point, and the dynamics
automatically stops.
(c) Jump discontinuities  :
 
Time
Observable
(d) A simple function such as    y = f(t) ,  becomes multi-
valued at some point t* . This can manifest itself as a sets of
discontinuous jump, or as a continuous branching into several
paths, or some combination of the two.
(e) A real-valued magnitude becomes imaginary or complex,
and thus no longer corresponds to a quantity in the real world. In
relativity, speeds larger than light are ruled out because they
produce imaginary values for β = 1− v2 c2
(f) The above case has several interesting generalizations.
One way of looking at the transition x ---> z = x+iy  , from the real
to the complex numbers, is to think of the imaginary part of z , or
y, as a new dimension. Thus, one may consider any transition
from k-vectors to n-vectors , n ≠ k , as an singularity. This may be
treated as a continuous transition by identifying the origins of the
respective vector spaces Vk and Vn .
(g) By transferring this idea of a  singularity to configuration
space, one can model the spontaneous breakup of a particle into
smaller entities by transitions from 3 coordinates (x,y,z), to 3N
coordinates.
(h ) The concept of an essential   singularity will be the focus
of our attention at various places in this essay: A singularity  of a
state variable S  at a point t*  is called essential if  it attains, in the
limit of  all sequences of neighboring points  to it  ,   every possible
value of its range.   The value at the point at infinity of the
function w=  ez   is an  essential singularity.
(i) Sometimes the Schrödinger wave equation is treated as a
distributed essential singularity    which is “smeared” over all of
space with a certain probability. “Particles”  are configured at
every location simultaneously. Quantum Electrodynamics  carries
this interpretation one step further: all possible paths of a sub-
atomic transition are considered as existing, even complex and
time reversed ones , with probability amplitudes which must be
summed to obtain the total picture. Indeed, situations in which all
state variables are essential singularities at all points must
uniquely characterize the quantum theory.
A similar construction applies to historiography: all
interpretations of past events can be considered correct if one
assigns to each of them a “plausibility factor” which functions like
a probability.
Let us now spend some time - not nearly enough
unfortunately - examining the treatment of singularities in the
customary  causal schemes of  Physics and Biology:
Physics
(i) Black Holes
The vexing  issue of the existence of irreducible singularities
at the very core of the causal description of nature,  has been with
physical theory since  Kepler, Galileo and Newton refashioned
physics into its present state. The conceptual device of
concentrating the mass of a finite collection of particles at its
centroid allows one to define a gravitational potential U(r) over
the entire universe.  U goes  to infinity at this centroid.
Theoretically  when  one point- particle becomes trapped in the
gravitational field of another  their relative speed  at collision will
be infinite. One can only give thanks to the creator(s) of our
universe(s) for having supplied its real material particles with
enough  extension, density and hardness to prevent such
catastrophes !
It is as if the universe had made a decision  to  divide by
zero at certain privileged locations . The dilemma is not readily
renormalizable. Indeed, it emerged as the core issue in Arthur
Eddington’s attack on Subramanyan Chandrasekhar’s discovery,
in the 1920’s, of the theoretical inevitability of Neutron Stars and
Black Holes. When a star’s gravitational field overcomes all
counter-active forces, it must automatically implode into this
singular state of matter. One might argue  that the existence of
such entities proves that the unthinkable can occur, and the
universe yet survive!  For the Black Hole is the material realization
of the infinite value of the gravitational potential  function at the
barycenter of an isolated system. The entire object is a singularity.
According to most  observational astronomers, it does exist: there
may even be one at the center of our own galaxy.
Not everyone agrees:   ( Quote Phillip Morrison: “I’ll believe
in one when I ‘see’ it .”    ). The observation that , in the visible
world at least, only finite amounts of any magnitude can exist
appears to be universal . By an argument first propounded by
Anaximander, an infinite amount of any substance  implies  an
infinite potential for Becoming in that substance. Since the theory
of the origin of the universe in a Great Explosion is well
established, what we call “time” began at some particular moment
in the past. Therefore the forces producing Black Holes have only
had a finite time in which to develop and operate, and could not
have produced infinity of any substance, including that of a Black
Hole.
(ii) The Big Bang
It was  previously observed that the  essential singularities of
Schrödinger’s interpretation of quantum theory are disbursed
throughout the universe in obedience to  a probability
distribution .  The Big Bang is the unique paradigm  for a  non-
distributed   essential singularity . Gazing back to the first
infinitesimal splinter of time from the initial explosion, the “Planck
instant” ( between 10-33 to 10-42 sec.) , one beholds  a singular
region of space-time  containing  all the matter and radiation of the
universe at infinite temperature . Assuming  that the amount of
matter/radiation in our is finite, then it is inherent in the  Maxwell-
Boltzmann statistical model  heat and temperature, that  the phrase
“infinite temperature “ is equivalent to the presence  of all potential
configurations of matter and radiation in that  single  instant.   In
other words , an essential singularity.
Although essential singularities embody the most complete
breakdown of traditional causation imaginable,   it is possible, (
we shall show this in the final section of the essay  ), by
constructing causal algebras based on them, to model the possible
forms of  determinism that may emanate  over time  from this
massively acausal event. This original Ansatz provides, we believe,
a solution to the fundamental paradox inherent in the Big Bang
theory, namely that from the Chaos of the global essential
singularity involving everything in the universe, there can emerge
the coherency and determinism connecting all phenomena at the
level of normal observation, i.e. non-quantum. Such essential
singularity causal algebras   may turn out to be useful as models
for the various inflationary scenarios that have gained currency in
recent years.
It is highly doubtful that Leibniz’s scheme of causation in
the  Monadology  6 ,  or that of Kant as set forth in the Third
Analogy of Experience in the Critique of Pure Reason , 7  ( both of
which posit the simultaneous influence of all things in all things),
can be consistently applied in any universe, closed or open,
without the requirement of singularities, void domains, force or
matter vacua , or essential singularities.
If all the matter in the universe were contained in a compact
region ,  the arguments already set forth would be sufficient to
establish this point. If one assumes otherwise, that matter is
distributed  throughout an infinite cosmos, one    quickly runs up
against an Ölbers Paradox :   if every particle is obliged to ‘feel’ a
perturbing influence coming from every other particle, then it
must be under the perturbing influence of a potentially unlimited
number of  forces. No object could withstand the accumulated
pressure of such forces, which would either dissipate all matter to
an infinite entropy, or crush everything into a Black Hole, or push
all things to the speed of light.
So,  if the total force acting at every point in space be finite,
there must be some mediating factor that dampens the
contributions of other particles, and it is obvious that this
mediating force must be an exponential expansion field. If the
force in question is the electromagnetic field, we are dealing with
                                    
6 “Thus, in saying that at any given time the state of each monad expresses the states of all the
others,  Leibniz is just asserting that, given a complete knowledge of the state of any particular
monad at any particular time, a sufficiently discerning mind could read off the state of any other
monad at that time. Further, each state of a monad similarly reflects all past and future states of
that monad. Consequently, if one knew completely the condition of any single monad at any
time, and if one had adequate logical powers, one could determine the states of that and all other
monads at all times. This is the sense in which ‘everything is connected with everything.’ “
Mates: Philosophy of Leibniz, pgs 38  , Oxford U.P. 1986
7 “ All substances, so far as they coexist, stand in thorough-going community, that is, in mutual
interaction” Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pg. 233 , Norman Kemp translation
the standard resolution of the Ölbers paradox: back reconstruction
to the origins of the expansion field leads to a Big Bang
singularity.
The investigation of  all the possibilities for the construction
of causal algebras for the modeling of Leibniz/ Kant  causation
would undoubtedly unearth some interesting mathematics. Yet a
strict adherence to their requirements raises  so many conceptual
difficulties, and is so contrary  to the way we actually think about
our world   , that there will be no further discussion of them in
this essay.
(iii) Particles as Systems in Isolation
Our attention has been drawn to this significant observation
:  it is precisely at the cancellation points of isolated systems  that
one  finds the infinite singularities of the gravitational potential :
the mass-weighted barycenters. Otherwise stated  the two singular
violations of Kantian causation:
(i) Cancellation points ( Inertia)
(ii) Infinite values of the  potential ( Gravity)
occur at the same points in space-time. This is not unconnected to
the equivalence of gravitational and inertial mass, which is the
cornerstone of General Relativity. Paradoxically, whereas (i) ,
being the nullification of a vector sum of momenta, is quite
consistent with mathematical continuity, (ii) , as an infinite
quantity, is alien to our conception of a finite universe.
Therefore every particle, treated  a world unto itself ,
contains   all  violations of Kantian causality. Conceptually there is
little difference between  a ‘particle’ and a ‘system in isolation’ .
No difficulties are anticipated if we sometimes use the two words
interchangeably.
Particles violate strict Kantian causation: it is not possible, from
accumulating  data on the inner dynamics of a single particle, to
intellectually project the history of the entire universe  in either
direction of time. If we enlarge the notion of a particle to
encompass this tiny patch of earth in the brief interval human
science, our quest for a Theory of Everything is unalterably vain.
BIOLOGY
The definition and identification of causal singularities and
cancellation points in biological systems is a subject of
considerable interest. What is it that distinguishes the animate
from the inanimate? If this were an essay on ethics or metaphysics,
the author would define a living organism as any physical object
which it is immoral to injure. Since our focus  is, properly
speaking, on  the mathematics of causation we can’t really use this
fundamental line of demarcation between the animate and the
inanimate, and will retreat to the far more restricted territory of the
cell theory. This combines the  hypothesis of Schleiden (1838) and
Schwann ( 1845)   ,   that the cell is the fundamental unit of living
structure,  with Virchow’s axiom  ( 1858)  ,  stating that all living
things are formed from pre-existing living cells. Up to the present
day, these are the  cornerstones of biology. The viruses may be
exempted from this broad agenda, or one might argue that their
relationship between the animate and the inanimate is not yet
well understood. In this section we will only be speaking of
organisms, that is, creatures formed from one or more cells.
By appropriately extending the conception of Death, we can
introduce an additional  axiom stating that all organisms die. For
the purposes of the present analysis, “Death” shall signify the
cessation of the individuality of the  organism. There are two ways
in which this occurs:
(i) Death in the ordinary sense
(ii) The splitting of the organism into two or more
units, either by mitosis, or the more complex process of meiosis.
Likewise, when an earthworm is cut in two and regenerates two
living individuals, we will consider that the original earthworm
has died, and two new ones born.
Since the eventuality of death is an intrinsic characteristic of
all organisms, one reasons that the total state S of an organism
cannot be identical at any two moments t1 < t2  , of its living
existence. The condition S( t1 ) = S ( t2 )  is equivalent to
periodicity. This ( as long as the nutritive substrate and chemical
composition of the environment are maintained and replenished)
would imply a potentially eternal existence . Note that this
statement is true, even when the individual cells in the organism
die off and are replaced by formally identical ones. Eternal identity
may be a plausible hypothesis for the elementary particles, but it
has no place in the definition of living organisms.
The Life-Expectancy Function
Because of  the absence of cycles,  the propagation of
biological systems within their appropriate phase spaces must
occur along  non self-intersecting world lines. Theoretically it
should  be possible, from the information available at any single
arbitrary moment in time t, to  define a monotonically decreasing
maximum life expectancy function   , L(t) ,  at that  instant, and a
minimum lower bound, B(t)    on the date of birth,  calculated
backwards from that instant . Organisms have built-in  clocks with
an irreversible count-down in the direction of the arrow of time.
Biological and physical systems exhibit major differences on
other particulars as well:
(i) The concept  of the system in isolation  is  meaningless for
biological systems. Organisms cannot be defined apart from the
particular substrates   off which they feed, or the range of external
conditions of their evolutionary niche:  All biological systems are
characterized by dependence
(ii) Each species of plant and animal possesses a characteristic
life-span, defined as an upper bound beyond which all members
of the species must perish. Despite the propaganda surrounding
Methuselah, and despite the astonishing advances of modern
medical technology, no human being to our knowledge has ever
living 200 years.
This upper bound is independent of all external conditions.
If as a thought experiment we idealize an environment E, in
which the potential for longevity is maximal, all other
environments must detract from that potential. Thus if, at age 60, I
know I cannot live another 90 years, then it may turn out that
something happening to me at age 70 ( a disease, etc.) may reduce
this upper bound to 20 years. But  nothing can raise it to  80 years!
When external circumstances bring about an abrupt
truncation of  life span, one can model the world line of the
organism as  a jump discontinuity  to the ground state. Even
without the intervention of fatal accidents, the  ‘vitality trajectory’
of an organism  points monotonically downwards. Although it is
customary, particularly in societies of advanced technology, to
believe in the existence of optimal environments for maximizing
the life span, our medical knowledge is very primitive in this area.
It is known  that the inhabitants of the  Caucasus mountains tend
to be  long lived, which may be  correlated with  vigorous
mountain climbing from an early age. This knowledge has made
no impact on the social customs of scientifically advanced societies,
where far too many persons spend  much of their time sitting in
automobiles and behind desks, and rarely bother even to walk.
 Yet it is undeniable that public medicine in the
industrialized world has made great strides in the eliminate of
famine, disease, ignorance  and war, and that people in them have
a expectation age for longevity at least twice that of the Third
World.    Although we all seek to live as long as possible, we also
realize  that, even in the Caucasus,  there is an upper limit to life.
It is a safe assumption  that for every person on earth  there is a
function L (t), defined as the longest possible time that person can
live upon reaching the age A= t - t0 , where  t0 is the time of birth.
Because of its substrate dependence, this function is not
Lagrangian .  one cannot,  from a knowledge of its value and that
of all its derivatives at any time, chart its future.
Whether comprehensive information about the organism’s
state function S at time t is sufficient to describe the value of S at
all previous times   back to  birth, is an open question. To a
qualified doctor, the signs of prolonged malnutrition  can enable
him to make an essentially accurate picture of a hunger victim’s
condition as it was before the onset of famine. How far   into the
past  this can be carried is conjectural. One does find  psychiatrists
who claim to be able to discern from a woman’s gait that she was
molested as a child; obviously they are arrant frauds.
It can be seen from this short analysis that there is more than
a little subtlety and complexity in the Darwinian catch-phrase :
“The Survival of the Fittest” .  Apart from vague generalizations
and certain large-scale projections, little seems to be known about
how vitality is affected by circumstances. There is a genre of
automatic thinking among many biologists, because of which they
assume all to readily that organisms behave in such a way as to
maximize their survival. All to often, this constitutes circular
reasoning : it may be convenient for the science, ( much like the
“hog theory” of economists which states that all human needs are
insatiable always), but falls short of explaining what we see in
nature.
Chain smokers have known for at least 30 years that every
drag they take on a cigarette is bringing them closer to the grave;
yet a great many have concluded that even the contemplation of
the ordeal of quitting is too painful. In addition, some of them
even continue to enjoy   smoking, bringing in an added
complication. Mixing pain, pleasure, survival and reproduction
properly in the Darwinian equation takes considerable skill: the
biologist’s model for pain as an enhanced defense mechanism is
simple-minded indeed.
(iii) Upon death the organism undergoes dissolution. As
when the keystone of an arch is dislodged , a lynch-pin pulled, a
ridge-pole broken, some key ingredient to the functioning of the
holism of the organism is put out of commission. This causes a
rapid shutting down of all sub-systems, followed by  the eventual
disintegration of the various components of the functioning
organism into  simple chemical compounds and elementary
particles: dust unto dust. 8
In contrast, the dynamical systems of physics do not
experience dissolution. Nor do quantum or thermodynamic
processes behave in quite the same way. Atomic reactions bring
about the transmutation of  particles into other particles. Although
matter and energy may transform freely  in some   isolated physical
system, the total amount of matter plus energy remains the same.
Likewise, the theory of heat, energy and entropy is a statistical
one. Fluctuations are permitted and they are known to occur. Yet
the universal dying of all living organisms is not considered to be a
statistical law like the flow of heat from warmer to colder bodies,
but an absolute law like the law of gravitation .
                                    
8One sandstorm in the Sahara says to the other: “Human to human” !
Causal Algebras for Biological
Systems
The preceding discussion has shown us that the Causal
Algebras employed in the modeling of biological systems should
contain  families of constants, variables, functions and operators
governed by the following restrictions : 
(1) Substrate dependency.  The metaphysic of the world-line
has no relevance to biological systems. The nearest equivalent to
this entity is the interaction surface   expressing the co-
dependency  of organism to substrate. Example : the Logistic
Difference Equation of population biology y = λx(1-x) , and the
corresponding Feigenbaum chart of period doubling.
(2) Irreversible temporal direction  :  Periodic, or even
stationary,  equilibrium states are prohibited in the functional
descriptions of organic trajectories.
(3) Temporal upper and lower bounds   on  the back-
reconstruction of ‘birth’ and the predicted time of  ‘death’. These
bounds  must be computable from the local configuration
surrounding  any moment  of the organism’s life span .
(4) The abrupt disintegration of the organism at death
should be modeled as the resultant  consequence of damage,
injury or destruction to some unifying, hierarchic principle within
the organism-substrate interaction. This takes the form of  a  jump
discontinuity in  entropy, with a corresponding drop of the
energy of the system down to the ground potential of inert matter.
We see that this collection of recipes for  biological causation is far
removed from the simplistic  world-lines of physical systems,  as
described by a Hamiltonian flow in phase space.
There are special difficulties associated with  condition (1):
substrate dependency.  Relative to pre-determined and fixed
substrates ( air, water, food, etc.) the living organisms tied to them
( For example, animals  in the vicinity of a watering hole, etc.)  can,
in theory, be assigned a “ Lagrangian”  . The local configuration of
the organism at any moment generates a function beginning from
some ground state and  terminates at some precise instant. In
between these cut-offs the trajectory is roughly deterministic. Such
a scenario cannot be modeled by families of analytic functions,
which lack these properties.
We will not, at this moment, further elaborate on the
construction of Causal Algebras  for biological systems, though we
intend to do so in subsequent editions. The subject is truly
enormous, perhaps as vast as life itself which is limitless:
epigenetic landscapes, Catastrophe Theory, Chaos Theory, the
Michaelas equation, evolutionary dynamics, even wide-ranging
philosophical systems such as that of Teilhard de Chardin, must
all enter into such a project. Key issues are substrate/organism
interactions, ecological dynamics , the respective roles of teleology,
freedom and accident, the identification of the “fundamental
particles”, or “systems in isolation” appropriate to the life-sciences
( genes,  cells, organisms, etc. ) . Even the moral issues specific to
biology ( and to no other “hard science”)   may be amenable to
algebraic descriptions.
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I. Lagrange/Hamilton Paradigms
(a) Mathematical Representations of the
Concept of the World-Line
 (i)  Elaboration of the
Dynamical Trajectory
More suitable to the workaday world of scientists  than the
Leibniz-Kant paradigm, the Lagrange- Hamilton  paradigm has
been the  modus vivendi   for the physical sciences   since the time
of Galileo. It has four parts:  
(i)   It is permissible to conceptualize arbitrarily large yet
bounded regions R of our universe, over arbitrarily large yet finite
intervals of time
T = [ −τ , τ ]  . The combination of the spatial  and temporal
interval produces a space-time region V = R⊗T  .  The duration
of T, 2τ , is  centered on a distinguished point  t = 0 , the origin, or
“now” moment of time.  R may be expanded or diminished to
accommodate the world-lines of any system placed within it, as a
function of τ . In the modern terminology of General Relativity,
the 0-point of time may be interpreted as a “Cauchy surface”, a
region in which the notion of a “present moment” is definable.
 The presence of all forces , particles or fields originating
outside V    is either negligible or proscribed. What this  means in
practice is that these entities   can be neglected as 3rd order or
higher perturbations. One must go to the 3rd order , dx3 , because
Newton’s Laws are first and second order in the time derivatives.
More generally one can speak of arbitrarily shaped “force
vacuums” on which external force fields exert at most a kth order
perturbation k ≥ 3 .
(ii)  It is permissible to assert the presence of physical
systems in  isolation     S, idealized from real observation, together
with  their world lines, operative in these force vacua V .
Generally speaking, Lagrangian dynamics is a local theory and
does not deal with  infinitely large  spaces or processes of
infinitely long duration . One can of course admit them as
idealizations in the description of strange attractors and related
phenomena.
(iii) Let S be a system in isolation.  In the Lagrangian
formulation   it is permissible  possible to represent S, at some
moment t=0 in time, as a single point in an affine Configuration
Space    of finite dimension 3N   , N being the number of  point
masses . In the Hamiltonian formulation   one may speak more
generally of representations in a Phase Space   of 6N-k dimensions
, whose coordinates cover the positions and generalized momenta
of the particles,  less the number k  of constraints. S’s  temporal
trajectory through either the Lagrangian configuration space or
Hamilton’s phase space  is called the system’s world-line ,  LS  .
The term “affine”  is employed here because no apriori metric
properties are assumed to hold apriori   between points of these
spaces. Their elucidation often gives rise to measurement problems
characteristic of specific disciplines. It is customary to place metric,
differential and simplectic structures on phase spaces, particularly
in Statistical Mechanics, but these are not essential to the notion
of the world line and the system in isolation.
(iv)  In both directions from the “present ” t = 0 of a
hypothetical observer , LS  is a single-valued function of its
coordinates at that moment, ( know as “initial conditions”)  , and
its behavior in any infinitesimal neighborhood around that
moment . This is true whether one is dealing with configuration
space, phase space, or any of the prolongation spaces suitable to
the equations of motion.
The  principles governing the local determinism  of
Lagrangian dynamics may therefore be summarized in the 3 key
expressions system in isolation  , world-line  , and initial
conditions  .
It is (iv) which supplies the crucial Lagrange-Hamilton
principle of causation that governs the construction of Causal
Algebras of agents
( operators and functions) over phase spaces. Notice that (iv) is
not inherent in  (i) , (ii) and (iii) . These rather express
independence from
principles of global determinism   , i.e. such things as Mach’s
Principle, the Hubble Expansion Field, the Cosmological
Constant, the Anthropic Principle, Cosmic Inflation and so forth.
Indeed, as we have seen from the work of Hawking, Ellis,
Penrose, Geroch and others  who have sought  to  describe the
large-scale structure of the universe on the basis of Einstein’s Field
Equations, Lagrangian scenarios are not sufficient to this task. A
considerable amount of extrinsic topological structure must also be
imposed , entailing  many difficulties in the designation of
singularities.
Condition (iv) may be called the principle of local
determinism  . As was shown  by Hume , it is not capable of
demonstration or proof. Despite this, ever since Laplace, many
scientists have accorded it the  status of an article of dogmatic faith
that  approaches religion.
The distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ , or ‘manifest’
and ‘derived’ information about the configuration of  LS in the
neighborhood of an instant is crucial to Lagrangian causation.
The direct information  consists of the actual values of the 6N-k
coordinates at the origin: the initial conditions. In and of
themselves,  these  are insufficient: a  photograph taken of the
system at this moment  will tell us nothing about its potential
evolution or antecedents . The shape of LS  before and after the
present  is indirectly   constructed by drawing a tiny hypersphere
centered on the location of S in the configuration space   V at the
temporal origin. The distinction between “phase space” and
“configuration space” mirrors the distinction between “direct” and
“indirect” information.
 Indeed, the complete specification of momenta and positions
represented by a single point in the phase space is required only for
the laying down of initial conditions of the trajectories in the
configuration space .  In this loose sense, phase space acts like a
tangent plane , or more accurately, a symplectic space, in  which
are housed the Lie algebra of vector fields that determine the flow
of world-lines in the configuration space.  One then applies some
computational process over or within that hypersphere that
records local invariants  obtained through its shrinkage back to
the  origin.  This is what is meant by indirect information.
Traditionally this has been assumed to be the taking of
derivatives. As we shall see, there exist other possibilities as well.
(ii) Collisions
Although collisions are characterized by discontinuous
jumps in momentum in the encounters of particles, they do not
violate the principle of local determinism. Let us carefully
examined the situation :
Consider  the moment of impact of particles, P1 and  P2 ,
with masses M1 , M2 , and opposing velocities v1 , v2  :
M1 , v1 M2 , v2
This may be identified in Phase Space by means of a single
coordinate
(x1, x2, p1, p2 )
p1 = M1v1 , p2 = M2v2
Before the collision, the equations of motion are simply
x1 = A + v1t
x2 = B+ v2t
where A and B are arbitrary starting points. The world line is
determined by a pair of polynomials  in two variables, invariant
first integrals of  in the  momenta :
Momentum = K = p1 + p2 = M1v1 + M2v2
Energy = E =
p1
2
2M1
+
p2
2
2M2
=
M1v1
2 + M2v2
2
2
We can use these equations to determine the new momenta
and velocities after collision, and from this compute the values of
the x-coordinates. There is a transfer of momentum in the amount
µ = ±
2(M2p1 + M1p2 )
M1 + M2
to each of the particles, the new total momenta being therefore
p1
* = p1 − µ
p2
* = p2 + µ
with corresponding velocities
v1
* = v1 −
2M2(v1 + v2 )
M1 + M2
v2
* = v2 +
2M1(v1 + v2 )
M1 + M2
A collision is therefore a singularity of a special kind.   It is
still true that the time evolution may be calculated from
information in an infinitesimal hypersphere drawn around the
instantaneous location. However the forward and backward shapes
of the world-line must be derived   separately  . Thus  although the
invariant integrals of the motion are analytic everywhere, the
specific equations of motion are only forward ( backward )
analytic from  the moment of collision, at which time there is a
jump caused by  the transfer of a discrete quantity of momentum
between the colliding particles .
Leibniz  expressed dissatisfaction with this traditional
treatment of collisions. He pointed out that  since perfect
“hardness”  does not exist in nature, collisions are never totally
abrupt but have to  involve a deformation in the shape of each of
the particles. The trajectories of their elastic rebound can therefore
be hypothesized as being analytic:
This is what is meant by saying that a  Lagrange-Hamilton
continuum is a symplectic manifold: it  combines the affine
structure of configuration space with its tangent bundle.  Via the
Poisson bracket, the collection of invariant integrals of the
Hamilton , or equivalently, the set of functions that commute with
the Hamiltonian, form a Lie algebra which, through the principle
of local determinism, completely  generates  the dynamic flow of
world-lines through V.
The attribution of physical reality to the concept of the
infinitesimal neighborhood is a central feature of those notions of
causation which are traditional to science since the 17th century .
The instant  , place  ,  infinitesimal displacement   and
infinitesimal neighborhood   are the magnitudes fundamental to
this world view. The proper topology for the representation spaces
of Lagrange-Hamilton causation is over the Cartesian products of
points and neighborhoods, as exemplified by the  “jet spaces” of
Singularity Theory and Differential Topology.
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(b) Algebraic Models for the Lagrange-Hamilton
Paradigm
Most of the differential  equations of classical physics are
second order in their derivatives and partial derivatives: Newton’s
field equations, Maxwell’s equations, the wave equation,  heat
equation and so on. Classical  solutions for them are preferentially
those which are not only CN for some integer N , but analytic
everywhere save at perhaps a collection of isolated singularities
that can be calculated  from the equations themselves.
The motivation for this preference is straightforward : the
unfolding of their entire history in both directions in time may be
computed from the information available in an infinitesimal
neighborhood about any point.  Analytic functions or families of
analytic functions exemplify the basic property of the Lagrange-
Hamilton paradigm. In line with the previous discussion
concerning collisions,   singularities of a certain kind may be
admitted. Though they require special treatment, they do not
violate the principle of local determinism.
The general meromorphic function is determined by a
Taylor-Maclaurin series up to its radius of convergence. By analytic
extension its domain may often be extended over the sheets of
their appropriate Riemann surfaces. Such  extensions may
sometimes  ( as in Feynman’s Q.E.D.), have a physical
interpretation.
This remarkable consonance between the conditions for
Lagrange-Hamilton  causation and the properties of analytic
functions has produced  a consensus in the physics community
over the last 300 years, to the effect that for any situation in which
local determinism is applicable, the universe  will conveniently
throw in  some algebraically structured collection of analytic or
meromorphic functions for its governance .
To take a simple example: under the assumption of
analyticity, if a  function φ and all its  derivatives at points t0 and
t1 are identical , then φ  must be periodic with period  ω = |t0 - t1 |
.  Yet there are alternative possibilities: consider  the standard
Helmholtz equation  dx
2
d2t = −A2x2  , A real .
If  admissible solutions are restricted to analytic functions,
they will be taken from the  family of trigonometric equations:
x(t) = Rsin(At +α ) + Scos(At +β )
Nothing inherent in the equation itself obliges us to make
such a restriction. There may arise  situations for which  solutions
need only be at most Ck for a fixed integer k . Examine the
following list of differential equations:
(1) x' (t) = x(t)
(2) tdx − 2xdt = 0
(3) x' 2 = 32 xx' '
(4) x' ' = −A2x
The form of  (1) compels its solutions to be analytic: iteration
of the derivative produces the sequence
x(n) = xn−1 =.....= x' = x   with solutions of the form  x = Aet  .
However (2) possesses  both analytic and non-analytic
solutions. The analytic solutions are   x =
g
2 t
2
  , g an  arbitrary
constant historically associated with gravitation .
A class of functions which are also solutions of this equation
is :
x = (g2 )t t
x=(1/2)gt|t|
T
X
 These functions are continuous and first differentiable; the
second derivative becomes singular at t=0 .  One might argue that
strict  causality breaks down at this point. Yet it is not causality
per se, but the Lagrangian paradigm that fails  :  the trajectory in
the neighborhood of any time to the left of the origin does not
contain  enough information to predict the shape of the trajectory
to the right of  origin.  One could imagine a particle in free fall
against the earth’s gravity which at a certain moment   is deflected
by an electromagnetic field. One can speak of a breakdown of
causation, yet one can also invoke the intervention of a new  C1
determinate force. In any case, without the restriction to analytic
solutions the mere form of  equation (2) is not sufficient in itself to
describe a Lagrange-Hamilton causal trajectory .
As for equation (3) , it also admits  an alternative,  non-
analytic  solution :
x = k t 3
This has derivatives up to the second order at 0 but not beyond.
Equation (4) is the traditional Helmholtz equation. By
introducing a slight modification of the definition of an nth order
derivative, a modification reflecting  the difference between the bi-
directional time of theoretical physics, and the mono-directional
time of real measurements, we will construct non-analytic
solutions of (4) :
Definition:  Suppose that a function x(t)  has a well-
defined nth order derivative everywhere in the neighborhood of (0) ,
but not necessarily at 0 itself. If     lim
t→0+
dnx
dtn
= lim
t→0−
dnx
dtn
   , given
that both limits exist, then we will call this common value the nth
derivative of the function at this point.
The advantage of this definition is that it is possible to
define nth derivatives at  points for which not all previous
derivatives are well-defined. Such a convention does in fact  reflect
the usual way of measuring  acceleration. Acceleration is not
measured “after the fact” :  change is always  in the forward
direction of time. Thus , the convention of taking the t --> 0+ limit
of the rate of change of the velocity as the “left” acceleration at
that point, seems the most reasonable. If this is the same as the
“right” acceleration, then we are justified in calling it simply, ‘ the
acceleration’ , despite the possible existence of  a “jump” in the
velocity :
v
t
The Velocity Jump Leaves Acceleration 
Invariant
Given this convention,  one can admit the following class of
non-analytic solutions for (4) :
x = r sin(A|t|+α )+ scos(At +β )
These might, for example, describe  harmonic wave fronts which
“spontaneously” reverse direction at t=0  in such a way that the
energy flux is unaltered.
(i) Non-Differentiable Models for
Lagrange-Hamilton Causation
Nothing inheres in the structure of Lagrange-Hamilton
causation  that requires modeling by families of analytic or
meromorphic functions:   
ANY algebra  A of functions  of time such that , for every
element
f(t)  ε  A, there exists a means of  extracting sufficient information
from the  infinitesimal neighborhoods  of  arbitrary  points in the
domain of f to reconstruct and back-reconstruct  f’s complete
trajectory , can serve as a model for Lagrangian  causation.
Although the combination rules preserving  analyticity are of
great generality, making them the natural choice for almost also
situations in the real world, they do possess inherent limitations
because of which they may be unsuitable in  certain instances. Let
us  review the rules of extrinsic  structure for some  familiar
collections of analytic functions in the complex plane:
(A) Extrinsic combination rules for the set CR  of all
analytic functions of radius of convergence ≤R , R > 0
If f, g ε CR , then:
(i)   af +bg ε CR  , a,b complex constants
(ii)  fg ε CR
(iii) f(g) ε CR    , when |g| < R
(iv) If f has an infinite radius of convergence , then f(g)
ε CR
(v) Let S ≠ R, both >0  . Via the homogenous
transformation
z --> (S/R)z all classes of analytic functions with finite radii of
convergence are equivalent: f (z)∈CR ↔ f (Rz S)∈CS
(vi) S > R -->  CS ⊃ CR
(vii) f’ and the anti-derivative definable from the
Taylor’s series are both ε CR   .
(viii) One can also develop a set of extrinsic rules based
on functions defined on the coefficients of the corresponding
Taylor’s series. For example, if
f = anzn∑  is  ε CR , then the function g given by g = an2zn∑
is also in this class. In general any function of the coefficients
which, after a certain point, diminishes their absolute value, will
produce a new element of CR  .
(B) Additional extrinsic combination rules for the
collection D  of analytic functions of
infinite radius of convergence.
(i)   f ,g∈D→ f (g)∈D
(ii)  fε D   ,  gε CR --> f (g) ε D
 Limitations on classes of analytic functions  become apparent
when we examine their situation relative to spaces
(a)  FR of all complex functions defined in  a circle
|z|< R, and
(b)  F of all functions defined for all complex z . The
function algebras CR and  D do not constitute ideals  , ( under
any of the composing extrinsic relations) as subspaces of the
above. This means that if  φ ∈CR, and ψ ∈FR  , then
aφ + bψ , φψ , φ(ψ ) , or ψ (φ ) , will not in general be analytic
with radius of convergence R .
In the next section, we will examine some causal function
algebras with the following properties:
(1) They model Lagrangian causality.
(2) They do not, in general, have the range of extrinsic
structures found in closed algebras  of analytic functions.
(3) Some are right ideals under functional composition  in
the space FM  of bounded real functions on the real line  . In other
words  If K is such an algebra, f ε K  , and g ε  FM  , then g(f) ε K
.
(c) Densely Periodic Function
Algebras
By a  densely periodic function on the real line we mean a
periodic function that has no smallest period. That such functions
exist is apparent from this simple example :
 ξ = {1 x rational0 x irrational
Another example is supplied by the classic non-measurable
Vitali set V from Lesbesgue measure theory. If A is an arbitrary set
of reals, let
 { x + A }  designate  the set obtained by adding the number x to
every element of A . Q is , as is customary, designates the set of all
rationals on the real line . If ri  and rj  are distinct rational numbers
then the Vitali set has the following properties :
(a){ri +V}∩{r j +V )}= ∅
(b)Q +V = /R
(c)Q∩V = ∅
Each rational  therefore translates V into a unique non-
overlapping set on /R  ; the complete collection of translates cover
the real line.  Let P(x) be any real function defined on the domain
V, and extend it to the rest of R  by the construction
∀x ∈V,r ∈Q:P(x + r) = P(x)  . Every rational is therefore a
period of P, and there is no smallest period.
Theorem I: Let  L  be the collection of all periodic functions
on R which have no smallest period. Then  L satisfies the
conditions for an algebraic model for Lagrange-Hamilton
causation.
PROOF: Let ρ  be an element of L,  x  any point in its
domain. By definition the values of ρ  in arbitrarily small
neighborhoods N around x go through its entire range. Thus, its
entire trajectory over all of R can be constructed from the
translates of N by any of its periods.
It follows that any natural phenomenon which can be
modeled by a family of functions of  L is governed by  local
determinism  causality.
In passing we may remark that “causation” is not inherent in
the structure of the world line alone, but  also depends on the
relationship of the function modeling that world-line to the class
of all the agents of its causal algebra. The causal structure of a
system S may be interpreted as a  form of local determinism when
derived from a causal algebra A,  yet subject to some other forms
of causation if the functions that produce it are elements of
another  causal algebra,  B :
Consider the differential equation:
dx
dt =
kx
t3
with  solutions
x = Ae
− 1
2kt2
This is not analytic at t = 0, although it is C∞ .   All of its
derivatives vanish at  t= 0 , therefore  no causal information may
be obtained from them. However if, rather than working in the
algebra of analytic functions,  we work in the algebra of functions
defined by a  Laurent Series , we can represent the above class of
solutions as
x = f (t) = 0 ,(t = 0)
= A(1− 1
2kt2
+
1
2!(2kt2 )2
− 1
3!(2kt2 )3
+..+
(−1)n
n!(2kt2 )n
+...),(t ≠ 0)
Densely periodic functions may appear to be somewhat
“ far-fetched” in terms of modeling natural phenomena, yet they
figure in the abstract theory of time measurement and clock
construction:
Let D be the integral domain of all real numbers of the form:
d = l + mα + nβ
(l,m,n = 0,±1,±2,.., )  ,
where  α is any non-rational algebraic number, and β any
transcendental number. Let
Γ(t) = {1 t ∈D0 otherwise
 Γ is a member of the causal algebra of functions defined by
such integral domains, D. Let’s say that our theory of causation
implies  that all of our modeling functions will belong to  D .
Since D is everywhere dense in R,  knowledge of the behavior of
Γ in any infinitesimal interval gives enough information to
compute α and β ,  and thereby  the whole trajectory of  Γ .
One can interpret such functions  Γ as models for the
pulsation of a system of 3 coupled clocks with incommensurable
periods. When  Γ = 1, one can imagine   a bell rings. Two such
rings set up an interval which, at it will be translated periodically,
can define a unit of temporal measurement. When Γ=0  there is
silence, and no unit can be established. The function Γ provides
us with a model for quantized time.
THEOREM II : If P(x) is a continuous  periodic
function on R, then it either has a smallest period or  is a constant:
Proof :  If P(x) has no smallest period, then those values x
for which
P(x ) = P(0 )  will be dense on the real line. Since P(x) is
continuous, it must  be a  constant.
Corollary :  If periodicity is the essential feature of local
determinism  for a system, then its causal function algebras will
contain only constants or elements of L .
Let us now examine some interesting sub-algebras of  L :
1.  Functions with no smallest period, all of whose periods
are commensurable.   
2.   Functions which have periods of length 1/2k , k = 1,2,.....
These take on an identical value in their range at all points of the
domain expressible as a finite binary decimal.
Example :   Let:
(a) f (x) = 1 , when x is a finite binary decimal
(b) If x is rational, and x = p/q in lowest terms,
then let
f(x) equal k , where q = k2n , and n is the highest
exponent of 2 in q.
(c) If x irrational, then f(x) = 0
In certain situations , such non-analytic Lagrange-Hamilton
models  may  be a better reflection of  the discrete semigroup
structure of actual experimental time,  than the “everywhere
continuous time” which is usually the  precondition  for algebras
of analytic functions.
3.    Functions with two, more, or even an infinite number of
mutually  incommensurable periods. These have already been
discussed in connection with the sets, D. 
4.  Generalizations of  the Vitali construction: let  B = { βµ } ,
be a Hamel Basis for the real numbers.  The construction of a
Hamel basis, the details of which need not concern us but which
depends upon the Axiom of Choice,  turns the real line into an
infinite dimensional vector space over the field of the rationals, Q .
Any real number ζ  , can be decomposed in a unique fashion as
the dot product of a finite number  of elements bn1 ,bn2 ,...bnk
from the basis . with rational numbers  r1,r2 ,...,rk  from Q ,
such that x = r1bn1 + r2bn2 +....rkbnk
Starting with a basis B , we separate it arbitrarily into a pair
of arbitrary disjoint subsets B1 , B2 . Let C1 be the collection of
reals built on Q and B1 , while C2  is the collection of reals  built
from Q and B2 . Then  
C1∩C2 = ∅
{C1 +C2}= /R
Define a function σ(x) arbitrarily on C1 . If µ is any element
of C2  , x any real number,  then we define σ ( x+µ ) = σ (x)  .
This is an element of L .
It is unlikely that Hamel bases  have much application to
physics, but they fill out the  mathematical picture. We should not
forget that applications for non-standard arithmetic have been
found in Quantum Theory, and categories in Quantum Field
Theory. At a certain point, the application of exotic mathematical
disciplines to physics becomes more than a little fanciful, but what
may appear exotic today can become the stuff of high school
education a few millenia down the future.
(i) Composition Laws for Densely
Periodic Function Algebras
(a) .  In general, φ and ψ ε L   does not imply  that
θ  = aφ + bψ  will be so.  However, if  φ and ψ  have the same set
of periods, or if  the set of periods of one of them is  a subset of
the periods of the other , then θ  will be a member of  L .
     (b)  If φ  ε  L, then functions of the form  λ = aφ (kt + r)
+ l  , a, k, r , l arbitrary constants, will belong to  L  with a
different period set and a  phase. L  allows for translations in both
time and space .
(c)  L is a left  ideal in the space of all bounded functions , B
. This property is common to all periodic functions. It is, naturally,
a one-sided ideal only  : if φ  is in  L , and ψ  is any bounded
function whatsoever, then
θ   = ψ (φ) will be a member of  L  , although κ = φ(ψ) may not be
so .This  property expresses an important feature of this form of
Lagrange-Hamilton determinism. Observe that the space of all
periodic functions does not, in and of itself,  constitute a causal
algebra for  modeling  Lagrange-Hamilton  causation: one can, for
example, envisage functions that are completely random in some
closed interval [a,b] , which randomness is then propagated
periodically over all time. Conversely,  although the analytic
function algebras  are Lagrange-Hamilton , they are not ideals in B
The next theorem expresses another important feature of L  .
Definition : By a systematic disturbance   is meant any
perturbation of a world-line which systematically modifies
positions, times and velocities but leaves the Hamiltonian, H,
itself invariant. The notion of what constitutes a  Hamiltonian  is
of course generalized to any sort of action principle from which
the laws of motion may be obtained. Algebraically  a systematic
disturbance ∆   may be thought of as a set of functions  of one
variable,
 
∆0,∆1,∆2,....,∆n ,
Ω0,Ω1,Ω2,....Ωn
such that
∆0H(qi , pi ) = H(∆1q1,....,∆nqk ;Ω1p1,...Ωnpn )
Theorem iii : Let W be a universe whose causal laws
are modeled by  functions from L. Then arbitrary systematic
disturbances  can be admitted into W without violating its causal
structure.
As examples of systematic disturbances one may cite some
universal transformation that instantaneously  doubles all
velocities, or one that shifts all light spectra to the red. By acting
on the left, the invertible functions of B  are systematic
disturbances: periodic phenomena continue to be periodic  and
there is no change in the causal structure.
Since the subspace  of  analytic functions is not  an
ideal in B  , either right or left,  systematic disturbances in an
analytic model may violate causality. Let W  be  a universe
operative under a cyclic time,  whose expansion-contraction cycle
imposes a fixed period ρ on all systems of W, and let Ψ be a
harmonic oscillator, or clock, constructed to oscillate at a period ζ
which is incommensurable with ρ .( Note that clocks in W with
commensurable periods do not imply Lagrange-Hamilton
determinism , but that incommensurable ones do! This is because
they must pulse with two periods  the pulsation points of which
form an integral domain  dense in the time continuum  . ) No left-
acting systematic disturbance on W will alter its period from ρ ,
nor will it alter the nowhere continuous dual periodic structure of
Ψ .
 II. Substrate-Dependent
Lagrange-Hamilton  Causation
One can also consider   non-standard Lagrange-Hamilton
causal algebras A  relative to a fixed energy  substrate. These may
find applications in biology, notably  in the description of
biological clocks.
The agents of such algebras will be dependent on a
substrate domain D which, by convention, can be interpreted as
some combination of  energy sources. In addition to the basic
forces of nature,  D would carry information on  nutrients,
chemicals, air and water, soil, sunlight, and other renewable  or
non-renewable resources. In the simplest models such as one finds
in the study of local ecologies, the functions of the substrate
algebra will share the domains of  the same  “survival parameters”.
For the application of non-standard models for local
determinism over a substrate, one can look at  a more general class
of functions  Ξ  including L , with the property that  every value
of their  range is attained in  every neighborhood of their  domain   :
densely periodic functions,  everywhere continuous nowhere-
differentiable functions, space or volume filling functions, fractals,
etc. Because of the imaginative work of Benoit  Mandelbrot and
his followers, such objects are no longer considered  pathological.
Fix a function   ϕ  in Ξ  . We  define Λ ϕ  as  the class of all
functions θ  ε Ξ ,  such that for any two moments  s and t  ,
ϕ(s) = ϕ(t)↔θ(s) = θ(t)   .
Under the condition that the complete trajectory of ϕ   is
given, known in advance, Λ ϕ is a substrate -dependent causal
algebra. One need compute the values of θ only in any tiny sub-
interval of the domain, then use its homology with ϕ  to
extrapolate over its entire graph.
For more specific applications, we can weaken the conditions
on Ξ  as follows:  we admit elements   α for which an interval  N
exists   in which α  attains to every value in its range in every
subinterval  . Fix one such function, α  to  be called the  standard
referent function  . Construct,  before,  the function algebra  ΛΝ, α .
This is  a Lagrangian  causal substrate algebra, the substrate now
being the region N. The elements of  ΛΝ, α  will be determined in
N, but not necessarily beyond it .
 Λ ϕ  and ΛΝ, α   have more extrinsic structure than Ξ : if f
and g are in   Λ ϕ  , then h = af + bg , a , b constants, will also be
in    Λ ϕ  . Λ ϕ   is also an ideal in B .
Notice, however, that it is not the case that
q(t)∈Λϕ → q(kt + h)∈Λϕ
 for constants k and h !  Substrate algebras are not invariant under
time translations or affine space transformations.
The whole notion of substrate algebras, or causal models
whose predictive algorithms depend on knowledge of a
previously predicated process or family of functions, can be richly
elaborated within the context of Lagrangian and other general
causation schemes.
For example, let  γ  be some fixed referent function,
uniformly continuous and non- constant in any interval (a,b) , and
A    the class of all analytic functions.  Then Aγ , the class of all
functions of the form
 f = g ( γ ( t)) , where g is analytic, is a substrate algebra. At any
given time t, the value of γ  is known. By construction it is locally
invertible, either from the left or  the right. This allows us to
locally   calculate all derivatives of g . Since the configuration of γ
is known one  can construct  the complete  trajectory of f from
local information .
Substrate algebras, as already stated, find their natural
domain of application in biology. In the above example γ   could
be temperature, Aγ  a class of “metabolism functions” dependent
on temperature.
 (a) General Observations  on
Lagrangian Causal Algebras
A reasonable requirement for any member of a Lagrange-
Hamilton  causal algebra is that all the procedures  which allows
the construction of a  world line from the neighborhood of a point
be  computable. Then it is possible to replace  infinitesimal
neighborhoods by suitably chosen countably dense subsets,
thereby eliminating the need for  exotic or ‘pathological’
constructions involving  Hamel bases, etc.
Let t1 < t2 be distinct moments in time on the world line of a
system S modeled by some Lagrange-Hamilton  causal algebra.
Let
H(q1,...qn; p1,... pn )  designate some generalized form of
Hamiltonian which, via some version of the Principle of Least
Action, generates the equations of motion X:
qj = φ j (t)
pj = ψ j (t) ; j = 1,2,...n
H  generates a world-line in phase space. All of the above
functions belong to the causal algebra. To derive H( t2 )  from H (
t1 ) one needs to know the values of
(i)  φ j (t) ;ψ j (t) ; j = 1,2,...n
(ii) A countable, indexed set of parameters { an (t1) }
computable from the defining processes of the causal algebra
(iii) Some invertible connection between t1 and t2
which, basically a formal scheme like a power series in time, or a
collection of periodic cycles, which we write as C(  t1 , t2 ) . The
general structure of a Lagrange-Hamilton causal algebra may then
be described in the most general terms by the metaphorical
equation:
H(t2 ) = Φ[H(t1);{aj};C(t1,t2 )]
Here the procedure  Φ  is the same for all agents of the causal
algebra.
  III. Essential Singularities and
Point-Source Algebras
A  Lagrangian Point-Source Causal Algebra  over a system S
is defined as follows:
(i) Lagrange-Hamilton causation is no longer  assumed
to hold in S  for all   moments  on the time continuum. Instead
one admits only a discrete set of points  Ω  , which may be
countable or  finite , or simply a unique starting point t=0   ,   at
which the Lagrange-Hamilton  property holds. From the
infinitesimal neighborhoods of the  moments belonging to the set
Ω it is possible to compute that portion of the world line of S
going from it to the right (present to future ) , up till the next
element of  Ω . The distinguished moments belonging to   Ω   will
be called  “seeds” .
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 I. Causality and  Coding
Codes
 Let AL  be some Lagrangian,  or substrate dependent
Lagrangian Causal Algebra. γ(t) is  any function in AL  , with
domain 0  ≤  t < ∞ , and uniformly bounded range.  Let t1  < t2  be
a pair of distinguished moments in the forward direction of time.
Since   γ(t)  complies with Lagrange-Hamilton causality we can
express the process whereby it constructs its trajectory from local
information. information as:
Ξ(γ (t1),χ(t1,t2 )) = γ (t2 )
Ξ  belongs to the extrinsic structure of  AL   , and represents
the algorithms  involving  in computing a countable set Π = {αj  }
of structural parameters ( analogous to Taylor’s coefficients or
Fourier coefficients)   from the configuration of  γ(t) in an
infinitesimal neighborhood of t1   χ is a “connection operator” ,
( infinite series , Σ ,  for example ) that calculates the value of γ(t2
)  from t1 , t2  , and the set Π .
 Let  S = s0,s1,s3,....= {sn},0 ≤ n < ∞   be a sequence of
half-open intervals of the positive real line :
sj = [aj ,bj ) with
0 ≤ aj < bj
There is no other restriction on these intervals,  which may
overlap or even be identical.
A  back-reconstructible  code   @ will be defined as a map
from the set of non-negative integers Z+ onto itself. such that
(i)  @  is a computable function Z+ ---> Z+
(ii) @  is back-reconstructible from any positive integer k .
Given the values of @ (j) , for j ≥ k , there is a recursive formula
for calculating   @(k-1) .  Thus, each range value of   @ at integers
k, can be derived from both :
(i)  recursions on previous values 0  ≤n ≤   k-1 , and
(ii) recursions on all values  k+1 ≤  n   ≤∞  .
Here is an example of such a code:
  C = 0,1,0,1,2,0,1,2,3,,0,1,2,3,4 ,......
From any segment of this sequence, one can figgure out that one
is dealing with an arithmetic progression, which can then be back-
reconstructed. These are examples of codes  which cannot be back-
reconstructed:
(a) C = 1 ,1,1,1,1,1,1,2 3,4,2,3,4,2,3,4,2,3,4,2,3,4,..... the
sequence 2,3,4 going on forever. Since the infinite segment
starting at entry 8 is identical to the one starting at entry 11, there
exists no unique back-reconstruction from  the infinite fragment
2,3,4,2,3,4,........
(b) C = 2,0,1,2,3,0,1,2,3,4,......
Although one recognizes this as an arithmetic progression,
there is no way from an arbitrary sub-segment, to back-reconstruct
the place at which the progression breaks off.
The application of  @ to the indices of the set of half-open
intervals S will build the arc of a new function λ (τ)  , from
sections of the arc of γ (t) . This suggests that the function γ must
be
of distinguishable character   : Given a < b , there do not exist a
pair of real numbers c < d , with l = b-a  = d- c , and
γ (a + t) = γ (c + t) ,∀t{0 ≤ t ≤ l}
Thus, no segment of the arc of γ   is congruent to any other
segment by horizontal translation. Next, subdivide the domain of
γ into segments determined by the elements of S, and concatenate
these arcs in a sequence determined by the application of the code
@   .  This process generates the arc of the derived function λ  .
Since @ is a causal code, knowledge of the shape of λ  after any
time T, combined with  knowledge of the behavior of the initial
function γ   , allows one to reconstruct the entire arc of λ  from T
back to the origin t = 0 .
Functions of the form ξ ( t) = λ ( 1/t )  provide us with  an
algebra for modeling point-source causality   . They map  ∞   into
the origin, and intervals of time from T to  ∞   into intervals from
1/T to 0 . As determined by the causal code , an  infinitesimal
neighborhood of the origin  of ξ   will contain infinitely many
sections of the arc
of γ ( 1/t)  .
II. Patterned Functions
The class of patterned functions is formed from the set of all
functions over [0 , ∞ ) by means of a causal code designated the
“pattern index function”. They  are of interest  because they
suggest numerous applications in the algebraic theory of
causation. They can model  point-source causality from essential
singularities, branching causality and the braided causalities to be
discussed in the final part of this essay.
DEFINITION:   P (t) will be said to be patterned if,
for any real number M>0, there is an L>0   such that P(t) = P(t+L  )
0 < t < M. In other words, any section of the arc of P is congruent
by horizontal translation to a section of arc at some  other location.
Since the arc including these copies and the intervening interval is
also a piece of the arc of P,  it follows that any section of P’s arc
has an infinite number of congruent equivalents all along its
range.
Periodic and  constant functions are obviously patterned.
Patterned functions are the simplest generalization of the notion
of periodicity.
(a) The pattern index function
Let n be any positive integer, and factor it as
n = (2k +1)2m . m is the exponent of 2  in n  .  ψ(n)= m   is  the
pattern index function  .  Its  first few value  are:
n
n
=
=
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
0 1 0 2 0 1 0 3 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 4 0 1ϕ( )
Extending the index function to non-positive values
becomes complicated: bi-directional patterned functions are much
more complicated than  uni-directional ones . For examples, it is
possible to construct a patterned function for which the complete
functional arc less than 0 is completely arbitrary. One then slices
off progressively larger pieces of the negative portion of the arc
from the origin,  then  concatenates them on the right side of the
origin by means of the pattern index function.
The way in which the index function organizes the range of
a uni-directional patterned function over the reals works as
follows:
Let A0 be some arbitrarily shaped arc over an initial domain
s0 = [a0 ,b0 ) :
To this we adjoin another arc A1 over domain s1  =[a1 , b1 ) then
tack A0 onto it :
A third arc , A2 is added, and the  arc A0A1A0  repeated:
The method of construction is clear:
P = A0A1A0A2A0A1A0A3A0A1A0A2A0A1A0A4.....
 The indices reproduce the range of the patterned index
function. Equivalently, the code determined by ψ ( j)  has been
applied to the  set formed from pieces of the associated function
A(t) .
(b)Terminology
The section point set   Θ = {aj }  is the collection of places at which
the domain of the associated function is cut.
FIGURE
The places where new material is introduced into the arc of P ,
produces a set M={Mj}  called the pattern set .
FIGURE
The pattern set is not unique: different versions of the
pattern set, relating to different ways of defining the section point
set, may still yield the same patterned function.
FIGURE
Patterned function with two pattern sets , { Mi }  and { Mi’}
FIGURE
 Corresponding associated functions and section points
If P(t)  is not too pathological one can define a unique
minimal pattern set   M , which allows one to back-reconstruct a
unique associated function A (t)  .
Given a pattern point Mj  , the pattern length   Lj   is defined
as the largest interval  , ( starting from 0 and less than Mj )  on
which :
P(t) = P(t + Mj ), 0 ≤ t ≤ Lj
Lastly there is the “D-series”, D = {Dj}. These are the places
at which  arcs of the associated function are spliced onto those of
the patterned function:
Assuming that M is the minimal   pattern set,  each of these
entities can be  calculated  from the others. The formulae  are
presented below, without proof, since  the methods for deriving
them are  straightforward:
(c) Formulae for patterned functions
(1.)Mk = Lk − Lk−1
(2.)ak = Mk + ( j +1− k)Mj
j=0
k−1
∑
(3.)Mk = ak + 2
k− j−2
j=0
k−2
∑ aj
(4.)ak = Lk − Lj
j=0
k−1
∑
(5.)Lk = ak + 2
k− j−1
j=0
k−1
∑ aj
(6.)Dk = (aϕ( j)+1
j=1
k−1
∑ − aϕ( j) )
(i) The Algebraic Structure of
Patterning
The translational congruence of sub-arcs  of patterned
functions gives rise to an algebraic structure which is a
generalization of the group of translations characteristic of periodic
forms.
Let N = n1,n2,n3,.....,nk ,...  be a patterned sequence of
positive integers, that is to say, a sequence with the property that
any finite segment is exactly reproduced at infinitely many places.
Assume that N has  more than one distinct entry. If S1 is a
finite segment of N starting from n0 ,  then we define the operator
T as the “gaped concatenation” of S1 with its next distinct copy
along the length of N. That is to say T = S1 ∧
( j)
S1
'
 . The letter j
indicates the size of the gap between the two copies of S1 , while
“^” is the symbol for concatenation.
The operator “E” fills the gap with the next section from the
associated function, S2 . Thus ET(S1) = S1 ∧ S2 ∧ S1'   By
convention E(E) = E. E is idempotent. If there is no gap in the
concatenation, then E doesn’t change the form of the section of
the patterned function. It is the operator “E” which distinguishes
a patterned function from a periodic function, which is built up
through repeated applications of T without gaps.
Applying the concatenation operators T and E in succession to
(A,S), the associated function with section point set , one has
T(A,S) = S1∧
j
S1
'
ET(A,S) = S1S2S1
'
TET(A,S) = S1S2S1
' ∧
j
(S1S2S1
' )'
ETET(A,S) = S1S2S1
' S3(S1S2S1
' )' ,
etc....
The algebra of operators generating a patterned function from the
associated function with section point set, consists of
combinations of T and E: T  applied to any segment of the domain
of P , gap-concatenates it with the next identical segment. E takes
any gapped form and fills the missing space with the relevant
sections of the associated function.
(ii) Composition Rules for Patterned
Functions
The combination rules for patterned functions determine the
extrinsic structure, the “modes of possibility” ,  of their
corresponding causal algebra. Let D  be the collection of bounded
patterned functions  with minimal associated functions on [0 , ∞ )
, and
let P ε  D :
(1) If P is patterned, then aP(bx+c)  is patterned
(2) Periodic and constant functions are sub-algebras of D
(3) If P and Q share the same set  of pattern points ( this
need not be the minimal set   in either case ), then F(f,g ) is
patterned, where F is any function of two variables with  domain
in  the Cartesian product of the ranges of f and g .
(4)  D form a right ideal   in the space F of all functions
defined over R0
+  . If f ε  D , g ε  F  , then g(f)  ε  D  . This is
true  for all functions produced by the coding method: coded
functional transformations are unaffected by any systematic
alteration on their range.
(5) The algebra of patterned functions is structured by
Boolean operations on the section point sets : If f and g are
patterned functions derived from the same associated function ,A
, but with different
section point sets, Sf and Sg , then one may construct patterned
functions,
notated h = f ∪ g,l = f ∩ g  , built up from  A via the section
point sets  Sh = Sf ∪ Sg ,Sl = Sf ∩ Sg .
For a  more detailed  picture of the dependency of the
patterned functions on their associated functions and section
point sets we display the appropriate  inversion formulae.
(iii) Inversion Formulae
The analytic expression for the pattern index function  ϕ(x) ,
the exponent of 2 in x ,  is : ϕ(n) = ([ n
2 j
]
j=1
∞
∑ − [n −1
2 j
])  . For
negative values, m = -n, this becomes
ϕ(m) = ([1−m)2 j ]
j=1
∞
∑ − [−m2 j ])
= ϕ(1−m) = ϕ(n +1)
The formula breaks down for n=0 as one expects for a
multiplicative function. It is obvious from the above that
ϕ(2ϕ(n) ) = ϕ(n)
Since the jth summand in these infinite series has period 2 j , one
can compute a Fourier series for the function ϕ(x) ≡ ϕ([x]) :
ϕ ~ 2π + 2π (
sin(kπx
2m
)cos(kπ(2x −1)
2m
)
kk=1
∞
∑
m=1
∞
∑ )
Define functions [x]D, {x}D,  as follows: If Dj  < x < Dj+1 , then
[x]D = Dj ,and
{x}D = j
It can be shown that the relationship between the patterned
function, P, and its associated function A is given by
P(x) = A(x − [x]D + aϕ({x}D+1}
A(x) = P(x + L{x}S − [x]S )
(d) Braided Patterned Functions
These inversion formulae are not sufficient, without further
information, to reconstruct the missing arc of a patterned function
from any given point back to the origin. The “braiding” of the
coding algorithm must also be considered :
We assume that we have complete information about the
shape  of a mono-directional patterned function in the interval [T,
∞   )
Under what circumstances can the missing arc, L, be
reconstructed, knowing only that P is a patterned function? There
are in fact two classes of patterned functions:
(1) Those which, given the forward arc from T, permit the
reconstruction of a unique arc from 0 to T, consonant with the
patterning requirement, and
(2) Those which  allow 2, 3, or even an infinite number of
possible back-reconstructions.
(i) Functions which back reconstruct a unique arc,  from any
point T , will be called “unbraided” .
(ii) If the  arc reconstructed from the point T1 is unique , but
there are several reconstructions possible from  T2  , then we will
say that P is unbraided at T1 and braided at T2  .
A function which is braided everywhere will be referred to ,
simply, as a “braided patterned function” .
The alternative back-reconstructions P1 , P2 , P3 ...  for a
patterned function at point T will be called the “braids” of the
function at that point.  On the basis of the previous discussion
one sees that  unbraided functions can model point source causality   
We present two ways of constructing braided patterned
functions:
[I .] Let A, B, C, D,.... be a set of distinct, finite functional
arcs with domains on the x-axis. We will construct functions P1
and P2  from concatenations of these arcs. Apart from the
requirement that the length of the domain of A be equal to that of
B, the domains of the remaining arcs in the set can be arbitrary .
P1 starts with A,   P2 with B
 P1 : A
  P2 :B
Adjoin C to both functions as “filler” , then adjoin A to both
sequences:
P1 : A  C  A
P2 :B  CA
Insert D as filler, and adjoin B to both functions:
P1 : A  C  A  DB
P2 :B  CAD   B
Insert E as filler, then repeat ACA in both sequences:
P1 : A  C  A  DE  ACA
P2 :B  CAD   E    ACA
Insert F as filler, then repeat BCADB in both functions:
P1 : A  C  A  DBE  ACA  FBCADB
P2 :B  CADB   E ACAF  BCADB
Insert G as filler and repeat ACADBEACA in both
sequences. The lower bracketting  indicates the patterning :
P1: ACA{DBE||ACA{||FBCADEGACADBEACA1 244 344 ||HBCADBE
P2:BCADB124 34 EACAFBCADB124 34 GACADBEACAHBCADBEACAF1 244 344
The method of construction is clear. Having reached a
pattern point, of either P1  or P2 ,  one inserts a new  length taken
from the set of sections  ( the operator E) . Then one applies the
patterning process, ( the operator T) , to the other function.
The associated functions for P1 and P2   are quite different:
A1 : A .C . DBE .FBCADBG .HBCADBEACAFBCADBI .....
A2 : B  .CAD .EACAF .GACADBEACAH .....
[II.] : Let κ and ρ  and  be two functional arcs of
distinguished character over the x-axis. Form the set of all possible
combinations of     κ and ρ , enumerated by some counting
method. For example:
C0 = κ ,
C1 = ρ ,
C2 = κκ ,
C3 = κρ ,
C4 = ρκ ,
C5 = ρρ ,
C6 = κκκ ,
C7 = κκρ ,
C8 = κρκ ,
C9 = ρκκ ,
C10 = ρκρ ,
C11 = ρρκ ,etc.
Concatenate the C’s into an unbroken sequence C0C1C2 .......
No matter how the enumeration is done   , the resulting functional
arc will be that of a patterned function that is braided everywhere.
Also, the number of braids increases to infinity as the initial point
T moves to infinity. Indeed, between 0 and T  any combination
of κ ’s and ρ ’s adding up to the length T  , can be combined  and
the resultant function will be patterned.
Braided patterned functions  will turn out to be  very
convenient for modeling some of the  forms of branching
causation  described in the next section.
THEOREM 1: Let P  be a non-periodic  analytic
function over the positive reals. Then P cannot be a patterned
function
Proof:   Analytic functions model local determinism.
Therefore any repetition of local conditions must produce an
identical future.  P must therefore be either periodic or non-
analytic.
Clearly, it is the very property which makes analytic
functions suitable for the modeling of Lagrangian causality, that
makes it impossible to cut and splice them to produce other
analytic functions.
Theorem 2 :  Let  Ω (z)  be some non-periodic,
analytic function over the reals. If Ω  , in combination with an
arbitrary section-point set Θ , is the associated function for some
patterned function, P, then P cannot be braided anywhere.
Proof :  Since A(z) is not periodic by hypothesis , all the
points of a pattern set , M, must be non-analytic points on the
domain of P
The set of points at which P  fails to be locally analytic is a
subset of the D-series {Dj }, namely { D2n }. To derive the pattern
point set
M = {Mj  }  one can employ  a simple congruence method: Since
A(z) is neither periodic nor constant, identical arcs on P must have
come from the same section of A  .
Via this procedure one can reconstruct the section point set,
and from this, combined with the analyticity of A, one can
completely back- reconstruct P from any point , T. Therefore P has
a unique back-reconstruction everywhere and is braided nowhere.
If   A is   periodic,  then braided configurations can be
produced because of the ambiguity of the locations of the section
points .
III.Branching  Causation
(a) Overview
One discovers that there exists a marked disparity
between the assertions made by scientists about their axiomatic
assumptions , and the methods employed in their actual research.
For example,  scientists  working in different fields usually assume
they’re talking about the same thing when they speak of
causality. However this is belied by the manner in which they
interpret their  findings and discoveries. We illustrate this
observation through  a brief survey over several  major scientific
disciplines:
(i)Mathematics
Mathematics is inherently acausal. A tautological relationship
between primitive elements  and pre-established axioms  is not
normally treated as causal. Causality implies both:
(i) Temporal dependence
(ii) Temporal asymmetry
Note that whereas (i) is basic to any discussion of causality,
 (ii) has been the subject to extensive debate ever since the origin
of  Thermodynamics. The facile resemblance of
“  ‘ p implies q’   does not imply ‘q implies p’   “
¬[(p→ q)→ (q→ p)]
with
“ ‘  h causes k’   does not imply that  ‘k causes h’   ”
¬[(h⇒ k)→ (k⇒ h)]
although both are asymmetries, does not introduce a causal
structure into mathematics. The material implication “ p implies q”
gives one no information concerning either the temporality or
atemporality of p or q. Thus, the statement:
S: “ If it rains today I had eggs for breakfast yesterday”
, is true regardless of the reversal of normal temporal orientation,
provided only that it does rain today and that I did have eggs for
breakfast yesterday. Indeed, for Aristotelian implication it is
sufficient that  eggs were on the menu of yesterday’s breakfast!
That these observations are not trite can be seen from their
relevance to the theory of questions. There are  two kinds of
questions: Logical Questions, which are addressed to “the
universe” and thus have atemporal answers ( such as “What are
the first four places of the decimal expansion of the square root of
2?”) ; and  Contingent Questions, which do not have answers
until the respondent answers them.
Example: I arrive at the opened door of a house, and shout
“ Is anybody home?”  This has various answers. Note that “Yes”
and “No” give the same information, as does “I’m coming”, or
“I’m not receiving visitors today.” However silence   has two
interpretations : either no-one is at home, or the respondent has
used his freedom of choice   to remain silent . The interrogator
cannot tell which of the two alternatives he is being presented
with.
From the viewpoint of the interrogator this kind of question
exhibits a temporal dependence, akin to causation in the natural
sciences. That the question is asked before   the answer is given is
fundamental. The situation is analogous to that of the
measurement problem in Quantum Theory: that the measurement
is made before    the data is recorded establishes a fundamental
asymmetry, which is not present either in mathematics nor in
classical theoretical physics.
Mathematics is acausal by its very nature. The suitability of
mathematical frameworks for the modeling of phenomena is due
to its acausality. If mathematical deduction were space-time
dependent it could hardly be of much use to science.
(ii)Reconstructive Science
History, Geology , Paleontology,
Archaeology    
Sciences with a predominantly historical emphasis employ
back-branching models and other forms of reconstructive
causation, Their conceptions are generally much broader than the
indirect proof of mathematics. It sometimes  happens that an
historic reconstruction leads to a unique scenario for some past
event,  the so-called  “smoking gun”. In practice, researchers in
reconstructive science are permitted considerable leeway, when
not laxity, in the multiplication of alternatives. There are  many
important questions for which definitive answers are never
found.  Either the evidence is too difficult to ferret out  with
current limitations on  technology, or it  has been permanently
destroyed, by death, fire, erosion, etc.
Who were the first hominids? Were the dinosaurs birds or
reptiles? What brought about the collapse of Mayan civilization?
What are the origins of the Basque language? Did Mileva Maric
give Einstein his ideas on relativity? Did Sally Hemmings tell
Thomas Jefferson what to write in the Declaration of
Independence?  In  reconstructive science one can expect to
encounter a climate of contention,  that can and frequently does
turn nasty, centered around equally defensible models for some
inaccessible past event.
Although many of these controversies do get resolved
through new  discoveries, the antinomies inherent to all
reconstruction of the past  will always remain . The most basic of
all is, of course , the antinomian couple:  “The past does/ does not
exist”   . In terms of its  practical consequences the debate over
Uniformitarianism versus Catastrophism   , of which Geology is
the paradigm, is the most important.
Uniformitarianism   is an article of faith without which there
can be no reconstructive science. It has two forms: the first asserts
that  it is possible to reconstruct the past by assuming that the
laws of nature are time independent, and were therefore the same
in the past as they are today.  A more specific  form, current in
Geology since the work of James Hutton in the 18th century, and
William Whewell  and Charles Lyell in the early 19th, is that the
processes at work on the earth in the distant past are still present
today. Even more restrictive is the view  that none of the
geological formations of the past were radically different from
those in today’s world. Today there is too much evidence in the
geology textbooks  to give this  credence: apart from the now well-
established Alvarez Asteroid Hypothesis, it is believed that the
Mediterranean Sea  periodically becomes an immense dehydrated
trench, with a drop between it and the Atlantic Ocean  thousands
of metres deep. No such formations exist on today’s earth .
Catastrophism   comes in many variants. At its extreme fringe
one finds the Creationists, who insist that we must all believe that
the universe was formed by divine ukases  exactly as stated in the
Old Testament. The more scientific form of Creationism derives
from George Cuvier in the 19th century: differences in fossil
formations at various stratigraphic levels are  due to autonomous
acts of creation preceded by total cataclysms.
The catastrophism that one finds in the Inflationary
scenarios of Alan Guth and others, simply claims that there are
features of the early universe  which require the assumption  that
certain  past events ( the near instantaneous cooling of the
universe), and the causes for these events ( the “Higgs field”) have
permanently disappeared from view.
Explanation by catastrophe has always been popular  in
Geology: Earth collides with Venus ( Velikowski) ;  Ice Ages are
produced through spontaneous  flip-flops of the Earth’s poles
( Brown) ; life arrives on this planet through its colonization  by
charioted aliens ; ( Von Daniken);  the sudden submergence of
entire continents ( Plato).
More credible catastrophist hypotheses are usually related to
the Great Extinctions, collisions with meteors and asteroids, and
gigantic volcanic eruptions. The problem with most catastrophist
scenarios is that they tend to  elaborate considerably over a paltry
database.  Many uniformitarian fiats suffer from  similar defects :
one thinks of all those “isotropy”, “homogeneity” , “uniformity”
or “steady-state” principles which claim some sort of scientific
foundation, but which are really the expression of the need to
believe  that the universe is not so unstable as to make science
inconceivable.
Cosmology is much more accommodating to catastrophes
than Geology. Geologists are hampered to some extent by not
being able to appeal to the mathematics of 4-dimensional
differential geometry, by which one can conceptualize pictures
that no-one can ever hope to see, even in  the mind’s eye.
Lacking a mathematics which enables one  to conclude anything
without committing oneself, geologists are obliged to be more
cautious.
A dynamic tension between Uniformitarian and
Catastrophist  philosophies  lies at the vital core  of  every
reconstructive science .  To understand why this is so  requires that
we conduct an examination of the distinguishing features of the
two  temporal categories of the  Unknown : Past and Future.
Everyone  recognize that the methods appropriate to
reconstruction are not the same as those applicable to  prediction:
the verification of a  reconstructive hypothesis depends on
predictive procedures , not conversely.
All theories are tested or falsified by the arrival of some
observable, predicted, ideally reproducible,  event. If the event is
sui generis  ,  one of a kind , then the circumstances that make it
possible must be so fine tuned  that  alternative explanations
have vanishing probabilities . This is almost always the case in
sciences such as archaeology and history, which often depend on
unique documents or structures. Sometimes homogeneity
principles substitute for reproducibility: millions of fragments of
Greek vases have given us a very good idea of how such objects
were manufactured.
In the presence of evidence that contradict them, such
theories  will be modified or abandoned. Faced with equally
fortified alternative explanations  it is comforting to believe that
new discoveries must eventually dispose of all but at most  one of
them. 9 Since in practice the  hypotheses surrounding a  finding
are not mutually exclusive, the final consensus will usually be
some combination of all of them.
In any case the verification of any reconstructive hypothesis
must of necessity be very indirect. It consists of two phases:
                                    
9Although  Villon’s “Where are the snows of yesterday?” still awaits an answer.
` (1) A model of some region U of space, in some interval
T of past time , may produce consequences for the present that
one can look for. If the Native Americans did in fact cross the
Bering Straits from East Asia many thousands of years ago, we
should find genetic similarities between , say, Tibetans and
Navahos;  which  we do . We expect that additional data from the
Hubble Telescope will help us to decide between a number of
models of the early  universe.
(2) One also looks for preserved objects   to fill in the pieces
of a reconstructive puzzle. The hypothesis that Richard the
Second was responsible for the murder of two children who
obstructed his way to the English throne  ,  (  a view contested in
Josephine Tey’s detective novel, “Daughters of Time”) , was much
strengthened by the discovery of  skeletons in the debris of a
staircase in the Tower of London that had, with a high
probability, belonged to them .
Two principles are present in any attempt to put together a
credible account of past events:
[ A.] Things ( distinguishable entities)  don’t
change unless there is a reason for them to change.
[B.] Things  don’t stay the same unless there is
something to prevent them from changing.
We need [A]  to give meaning to  the expression,  “preserved
object from the past”. Without it  there could never be any
grounds for saying that anything ,  from a Leakey skeleton to a
Dead Sea scroll, was a link to the past.
[B]  is invoked for justification of the various methods of
dating  objects that were presumably created at some time in the
past ,  potassium-argon , carbon-14 , dendrochronology ,
glottochronology, Cepheid variable stars ( also used  for gauging
distances  because of the universal value of the speed of light),   or
by the indirect association with other things in the same
environment which can be dated by these means.  If Permanence
were not embedded in Change , there would be no way to
compare  the scientific value of Lucy’s skeleton  to  that of
Piltdown Man, or  that of a Dead Sea scroll to  a Xerox of a Dead
Sea scroll.
Example:   In the New York Times of February 14th, 1985, it
was reported that  a bundle of old letters was discovered under
the staircase of a house that once belonging to Abraham Lincoln’s
son. Most of them are copies of letters one has reason to believe
were written by him. In assessing the worth of this discovery
many assumptions are made:
(a) Stability of language : American English has not changed
so drastically  that significant words or phrases have become
totally misleading.
(b) That certain universal criteria of truthfulness will enable
competent historians to judge when the  author  was telling the
truth or when he was lying.
(c) That the entire cache is not just somebody’s hoax. It is
known that hoaxes don’t have to be very clever to succeed: van
Maegheren’s faked Vermeers , dozens of works falsely attributed
to van Gogh or Haydn, Piltdown Man , the Shroud of Turin, etc.
(d) The existence and reliability of independent means of
dating paper and ink,  the handwriting, mouse droppings, and so
on.
(f) Comparative dating by allusions to contemporary
events; checking for anachronisms, ( a method that quickly
disposes of most art forgeries) .
 That these letters do indeed constitute a solid link with the
past can therefore be asserted only in a context saturated with
theoretical considerations. Was Lincoln’s son as truthful as the
legendary  Honest Abe? Since the writer of a letter may have as
many reasons  for lying as for telling the truth, the long term effect
of this discovery may be disinformative, temporarily ( or
permanently! )  increasing our ignorance of the 19th century.
To summarize: confirmation of a reconstructive hypothesis
requires not one but several acts of faith. Among them is the belief
that there exists evidence which has mysteriously escaped the
ravages of time, that will eventually turn up to cast the deciding
vote between equally likely hypotheses. If such evidence does
surface, it will itself have meaning only within a framework of
many theoretical assumptions.
For centuries it was felt that certain passages in the
published versions of Bach’s chamber music ( notably the
orchestral suites)  were wrong. Professional musicians were afraid
to tamper with them.  Autograph manuscripts were  recently
discovered that confirm what the more perceptive and
independent-minded had always maintained. A pretentious
mystique surrounds the works of any great artist, and acts of true
bravery are required of anyone who asserts  that what we possess
may not always be the just expression of  the artist’s intentions.
The public for art  directs its critical judgment to the  task of
penetrating  into the deeper meaning of  scripture , whether it be
a Brandenburg Concerto, a play of Shakespeare’s. or an  alleged
Rembrandt .  Thus, both predictive and reconstructive models
depend on future evidence .It is because of the complementary/
contradictory  principles [A] and [B] that there will always be a
Uniformitarian/Catastrophist controversy at the heart of all
reconstructive science. Note that a major discovery of new
evidence from the past generally produces  far-reaching
disruptions within   any reconstructive science. Catastrophism may
or may not characterize  the content of a reconstructive  science,
but it always characterizes its own history!   It is incautious to set
too much store by  models which are too uniform. New evidence
has a way of demolishing established theories with terrifying
regularity.
This is also true in physics and the other hard sciences; yet
there is no comparison between the ways in which Einstein’s
theory of gravitation supercedes Newton’s  theory of gravitation,
and  the way in which, for example,  the discovery of Viking
artifacts in New England completely demolishes the theory that
Christopher Columbus was the first European to visit the New
World. Since there is a high degree of catastrophism in the daily
conduct of the reconstructive  sciences, one should  always allow
for a degree of catastrophism in the theories themselves.
At the same time, if everything has got to be explained by
miraculous interventions or random occurrences, the field quickly
degenerates into a mass of ad hoc  hypotheses,  ceases indeed to
be a science. If the processes at work in the past are as inaccessible
to us as the events they are marshaled to explain,  there is the risk
of setting up  an indefinite regress of explanation. Hypotheses
that do not, in one way or another, have their roots  in the
present, lose all scientific worth.
Why does the sun shine?   God created it. How did he create
it? He said, “Let there be light!” Why did he decide to say that?   
Because he was “well pleased” with Himself for doing so. Each
‘explanation’ in the chain gets pushed further back in its degree of
inaccessibility.  We encounter  no  gods  walking around today
who can create suns by saying “Let there be light!” We therefore
have no way of knowing if these activities  gives them pleasure.
Inaccessibility is being  “explained” by further inaccessibility.
In other words, principle [A]“Nothing changes without a
reason. ”     opens the door for potential ‘explanations by
catastrophe’ whenever continuity with the present is not
rigorously established. Likewise principle [B]  stresses the
necessity for uniform processes that guarantee the invariance of
objects, structures and natural forces from one period to the next.
“Creationism” may well be bogus science, not even a science
at all, yet whatever value it does have lies not so much in its
fanciful Biblical reconstructions, as in its critique of the fatuously
“smooth”  evolutionary chains advanced by the paleontologists.
Working in another reconstructive science, archaeologists are only
now beginning to look at the way global weather patterns have
brought about seemingly disparate historical events all over the
world. One contemporary theory relates the rise of Islam, the
appearance of bubonic plague, the destruction of Aztec temples,
crop failures around the world and the Avar invasion of Europe to
the weather conditions created by the gigantic explosion of
Krakatoa in the 7th century. Such a theory combines
uniformitarian with catastrophist elements.
The Uniformitarian/Catastrophist antinomy is inherent to
reconstructive science. Dogmatism on either side of the divide  is
inadvisable.
(iii)Descriptive Science
Journalism, Meteorology,
Structuralism
The excessively reductive, yet convenient, representation of
Time as  a 1-dimensional Euclidean manifold imposes a natural
subdivision at each instant into Past, Present and Future. There
are, in addition, two forms of the present: the abstract or relative
present used in physics, and the absolute or real present of
conscious awareness.
The subtleties of the  abstract present    , neither fully present
nor fully past, are to be seen in the multitude of tenses, such as
those expressing an action begun in the past and on-going ( “I
have been watching the cows” ) , or begun and completed in the
past , ( The perfective: “The roast is burnt”, as opposed to “The
roast was burned”), or simply past with no indication as to its
continuance ( “He sat on the chair” - he may still be sitting there
for all we know ), or on-going but interrupted ( “I was seeing the
light when you walked into the room”) , along with combinations
of these.
Written French also uses an “absolute literary past”  , a kind
of timeless time appropriate to fiction : Il observa les fleurs sans
regret .  “He was observing the flowers without regret ”; All tenses,
including “He observes the flowers...”, and “He observed the
flowers” are contained in this expression by being placed in the
realm of the imagination.
The real   present is the present of individuated
consciousness : I am alive now,  and I am aware of it . The  “now”
in which I am writing these sentences is assumed, perhaps falsely ,
to be the same as that of all other persons sitting in or walking
around in the cafe-bookstore where I happen to be working . It is
the same ‘now’ which  one used to assume  could be objectified as
“   9:37 Junes 17,2000   ” throughout  the entire cosmos, yet which,
since the appearance of the Theory of Relativity   has become  an
open question. Is my subjective present identical with yours? Is
the sum total of all subjective presents identical with an objective
present? And so forth.  This essay evades all such issues in by
restricting its focus  to the abstract time of science. This overly
simplified but useful fiction is reflected in the way in which one
may classify all sciences as Reconstructive, Descriptive and
Predictive.
Descriptive sciences likewise divide into pure and applied .
One finds  pure and applied mathematics, theoretical and practical
economics, descriptive and Chomskyian linguistics 10  , the theory
of disease and the description of disease , etc. Among the applied
descriptive sciences on can include Journalism, Anthropology,
Classificatory Biology, Meteorology, etc.
Even as Mathematics is an entirely descriptive pure
science,  Journalism is an entirely descriptive applied science.
Mathematics is atemporal,  Journalism dedicated to the momentary
description of transient events. What links these two fields is that
neither of them makes predictions or incorporates causality.Of
course there is lots of bad journalism, infected with vindictive
moralism, which assigns blame with free-wheeling impunity. The
best journalists record the facts as they occur, in such a way as to
permit the reader to draw his own conclusions.  Although the
conjectures raised by mathematicians do resemble the predictions
of physics, refutation by contradiction is not quite the same as
refutation by evidence from a failed experiment.
 Every science  partakes in various degrees in  all 3 temporal
modes. The focus of a descriptive science  is on the accurate
description of present or presented phenomena,  pure diagnosis,
                                    
10 Which I happen to believe  is fraudulent;  yet  its goal is to turn Linguistics into a
theoretical science, with “language” subject to mathematical laws
setting aside all  historical speculation  or future consequence .
Speaking informally, one might suggest that Reconstruction
makes use of the mathematics of modal logic, Prediction the
mathematics of analysis and probability, and Description the
relational structures of Algebra: lattices, groups, partitions, etc.
All of the disciplines that flourish under the vague label of
“Structuralism” are descriptive. Simply described, structuralism is
a crash program much in vogue in the 60’s and 70’s, that aspires to
raising the  immense accumulation of uninterpreted data in the
warehouses of the human sciences, ( Anthropology, Linguistics,
Psychology,  Sociology, Political Science  ) to the level of pure or
theoretical science. The search for universal structures in human
institutions and artifacts may be seen also as a search for the
appropriate causal algebras to be employed in back-reconstruction
and prediction.
IV. Branching Causality
Branching Causality arises when :
(1) A decision in favor of one out of several  proposed
models of the past  cannot be made on the basis of available
knowledge.
(2)Probabilities can be assigned to these models
(3) It can be rigorously demonstrated, or is highly likely that
in the time at one’s disposal, it will not be possible to set up a
procedure for selecting a unique past from the options available.
This can mean several things:
(a) The observer disturbs or destroys the observed in
the course of the experiment, as in
(i) Archaeological excavations which destroy their 
sites
(ii) Biologists who kill their specimens
(iii) Particle physicists generating quantum 
uncertainties.
(b) Time has destroyed too much evidence to allow for
a unique reconstruction:
(i) Erosion
(ii) Death of witnesses
(iii) Information destroying processes in the 
formation of Black Holes
(c) The requisite knowledge is intrinsically inaccessible,
hence unknowable
(i) Cosmic censorship inside a Black Hole
(ii) Schrõdinger’s Cat
(iii)  Life after death, or before birth
Back-branching causality appears explicitly in Quantum
Theory in many contexts. The classical picture of von Neumann of
the “collapse of the wave packet” assigns definite probabilities to
each value in a  spectrum of eigenvalues. All of them are assumed
to “exist” before any observation is made.
The reductive simplicity of quantum physics cannot serve as
a model for human history. Strange, is it not, that although a
historian must be committed , even more than a physicist, to the
belief in the past’s uniqueness, it is he, more than any other
scientist, who must keep alive all the alternative interpretations of
past events?
Persons who care to do so are free to speculate whether
branching causality exists only in the representation spaces, or
reflects some intrinsic structure in real time. Can the present really
be the product of a collection of independent pasts? In sciences
such as history, archaeology or paleontology one is frequently
obliged to represent the state of one’s knowledge as a collection of
autonomous pasts. The theoretical belief in a unique past must
often be abandoned in practice.
Let’s imagine that Chaucer and Froissart somehow got
together in France during the Hundred Years War of the 14th
century.  Chronicler and fiction writer conspired to play a joke on
mankind by concocting an  account of a ferocious battle  set near a
little village named Agincourt.
Though this makes  the battle of Agincourt pure  fiction,
belief in its reality has had an immense influence on subsequent
history, from Shakespeare to Winston Churchill to Desmond
Seward to  Barbara Tuchman. Isn’t that enough? Must  historians
maintain that a real battle must leave  consequences visible today?
Yet how otherwise does one distinguish a battle invented by
Froissart from the ones he  actually witnessed ?  Unlike the
situation in physics and chemistry , one can’t experiment with
history.
Since the “past” is always a back-reconstruction, back-
branching causality can never be eliminated from the
representation spaces of the reconstructive sciences.
It is a commonplace of detective fiction, and all too often of
crime in the real world, that the criminal will murder his victim for
the sole purpose of rendering a unique reconstruction of the crime
impossible. A strict Lagrange-Hamilton  description of cause and
effect via local determinism may exist in that case  only in the
mind of the perpetrator. For all others,  judge, jury, lawyers,
journalists and the public,  a scenario of  branching causality
leading to and from the event may be the best one available.
Note  that there is nothing within even the strictest
formulation of classical causality that guarantees that enough
information must be left lying around to allow us to make a
unique reconstruction of the past. The local determinism of the
Lagrange-Hamilton paradigm implies  that different pasts must
result in different presents. It does not give us any help in
reconstructing that past.
Indeed, there is little  in our experience to cause us to believe
that the past has to be unique. If two entirely different pasts can
be shown to produce virtually identical presents, why do we need
an axiom to tell us that only one of these must be correct? For the
most part causality is only concerned with future connections: a
unique future must come out of a unique present. One does not
even have to assume that one is living in a unique present: all that
a workable axiomatic framework for physics has to assert is that
given   a unique present, then a unique future is inevitable.
Mathematical frameworks for   back-branching causality can be
developed without consideration of  the philosophical issues
concerning either the uniqueness or multiplicity  of the past.
One of the things which Thermodynamics seems to be
saying is that the past, no more than the present, is not static: it,
too, can be lost. Since the ideas of entropy and of a measure of
information content are closely related, it is possible to interpret
the dissipation of mechanical energy into non-reconvertible heat
as the destruction of knowledge, that is,  loss of the past. A
consequence of the existence of inaccessible energy is that the
calculation of the  coefficients of local determinism, ( whether by
differentiation or other means) can only be approximated. Thus,
both past and future thermal trajectories are of necessity
branched. This may in fact be the real meaning of the concept of
“dissipation” .
Similar observations can be made relative to the
Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. Any real or conceptual physical
experiment in which the observer is placed within the system in
isolation   ,  leads unavoidably to perturbations in all measuring
processes. As in quantum theory, these find expression in a
multitude of pasts converging causally on the present.
The determination of stellar distances requires a form of
branching description that is intrinsic to the character of
Astronomy as a science. In the absence of compensating factors, it
is formally impossible to distinguish a bright star which is very far
away from a dim star that is close at hand. Until more external
evidence becomes available, all possible distance determinations
must be kept in the model, and there is no a priori reason to
believe that such external evidence will show up.
(a) Mathematical Models
Fix some moment of time T > 0 away from the temporal
origin. Let t stand for the quantifiable time  variable,  P the class
of all real-valued patterned functions defined on the interval I =
[T , ∞ )  .  Let Λ  be the sub- algebra of unbraided patterned
functions, that is to say, all patterned functions f defined on I
which allow one to make a unique back-reconstruction from T to
the origin:
f ,g∈Λ→ [( f (t) = g(t),t ≥ T )→ ( f (t) = g(t),0 ≤ t ≤ T )]
Choose f ε Λ   , and assume that f is not pathological. Then it
comes from a minimal associated function A , and minimal section
point set, S. Since f is unbraided, the domain of A can be
uniquely extended back from T  to 0 . Given the function A , one
can combine it with  arbitrary section point sets Σ  , to derive a
collection of patterned functions Ω all derivable from the same
associated function, A .
Some of the patterned functions derivable this way may  be
braided. However, there exists a class of patterned  functions Λ* ,
which are generated from associated functions such that none of
the patterned functions derivable from them will be braided. We
will say that the functions in Λ∗ are  absolutely reconstructible  ,
whereas those in Λ   will be called, simply,  reconstructible  .
Let  f ε Λ∗   and  examine the behavior of g = f(1/t ) around
the origin in the interval (0, 1/T  ]  , it is possible to reconstruct all
of g from knowledge of its shape in this interval. From that we can
reconstruct all of f.  And from f we can derive a unique associated
function A, provided the following list of conditions are satisfied:
(i) g is non-constant on any interval
(ii) f = g(1/t ) is uniformly continuous
(iii) The associated function is also continuous
Among all possible candidates, we naturally select the with the
minimal pattern set.
(b) Examples of Models for  Branching
Causality
Construction A:
(1) “Time” begins at an essential singularity - a “Big
Bang”.
(2) This sets up a point-source algebra; The entire
future can be derived from calculations made in the neighborhood
of that origin.
(3) Until time T >0 , one is dealing with a phenomenon
combining a pair of criss-crossing branches , or braids.
(4) At T  the two branches merge into a unique causal
flow, unto eternity
(5) In the region [T , ∞ )  causation obeys  Lagrange-
Hamilton local determinism : any neighborhood around any
instant   contains complete forward predictive information.
Start with any analytic, non-periodic function defined over
the positive temporal line  y = γ (t ) ,  real and bounded away from
0 .  Let θ (t)  = γ (1/t ) . Then the arc of γ    from some fixed point
a, to infinity, will be in 1-1 correspondence with that of  θ  from
1/T to 0 .
Let U and V be distinct section point sets
U a s s s s
V a r r r r
k
k
=
=
{ , , , , ,...., ,....}
{ , , , , ,......, ,....}
0
0
1 2 3
1 2 3
Let α  be the  associated function for γ  . Using U and V as
section point sets, we form two patterned functions:
P1(α ,U) ; P2(α ,U)
Then the functions
Q1(t) = P1(1 / t)
Q1(t) = P1(1 / t)
will satisfy the above recipe for simple branching causality:
(i)    Since both P1 and P2 are unbraided, they model strict
causality outwards from the essential singularity t =0 , of Q1 and
Q2 .
(ii) Between t =0   and t =T  , Q1 and Q2 form independent
paths, alternately recombining and separating.
(iii)   For t>0, they merge into a unique flow
(iv) In the region [ T , ∞  ) , Q1 = Q2 = α (1/t ) is analytic: if f
has no singularities from 0 to  T , then  α(1/t ) will have no
singularities from 1/T  to   ∞  , any t > 0 .
Illustration :
 For associated function we choose α(x) = sin(x) ; T = 2π
The two section point sets will be given by the roots of the
equations
U(t) = t1sin( 2t)+ sin( 3t)
V(x) = t2 sin( 5t)+ sin( 7t)
 t1 and t2 are calculated from the conditions:
U(0) = V(0) =U(2π) = V(2π) = 0;
t1 = −
sin(2 3π)
sin(2 2π)
,t2 = −
sin(2 7π)
sin(2 5π)
The “inverted argument” functions
Q1 = P1(1 / t;α;U),Q2 = P2(1 / t;α;V )
are continuous  everywhere and analytic everywhere save at a
countably infinite set of discrete points converging to the origin .
Construction B :
Branching Causality Converging to
a
Future   Essential Singularity
(1) From  time t = 0 ,  there is  a unique causal trajectory  up
to some fixed moment T.
(2) Before the zero-point, there were a pair of  braids L1  , L2
each of them converging with local determinism  fashion to the
same forward arc.
(3) After t = 0 the system does not obey local determinism.
However, as one approaches T it is possible to reconstruct the
path with ever greater accuracy.
(4) Complete knowledge of the shape of the world-line may
be obtained by calculations made in any neighborhood of the
future terminal point T . One can thereby reconstruct not only the
segment from 0 to T, but the two braids from zero to minus
infinity.
(5) At the moment t =T the system collapses into an essential
singularity.
This  recipe can be modeled  by braided pairs of patterned
functions.
Let  P1 , P2 be a pair of braids derived from an analytic non-
periodic function Ζ(t ) in the manner described in the example on
page  14 . Keeping with the same notation, the front section of P1
is designated A, that of  P2 is designated B. We require that the
domains of  A and B   have  the same length, L. Define
Q1 = P1(−
1
(t −1 L)
)
Q2 = P2(−
1
(t −1 L)
)
These functions in combination reproduce all the features of
the recipe:
DIAGRAM
(1) The  branches merge at t=0 into the “inverted argument
form” of the congruent portions of the pair of braids P1 and P2  .
(2) In the inverted argument form, the two braids translate
back into independent branches from 0 to   - ∞ .
(3) There is an essential future singularity at t = 1/L
(4) As one approaches this singularity, and more information
becomes available to us, one can back reconstruct over greater
reaches of the past with greater accuracy
(5) If one could somehow compute from the future point to
any other point close to it in time,  the complete trajectory of the
system for all past time would become known .
This picture has much in common with the way real science
advances . Initially  one knows nothing about the pas.
Knowledge about what happened historically accumulates
gradually as one advances into the future.
Likewise,  predictions  concerning the future only take one
forward a short distance in time. One  would have to go all the
way to the end of time before really understanding everything
that is happening in one’s present environment . As one goes
further into the past, the number of branching or alternative
scenarios  increases: the braids become frayed in proportion to the
distance of past events from us.
 We see that this picture is, in certain respects, more faithful
to our state of knowledge at any given moment, than the fiction
of a  smooth, uniquely determined scheme of things that we all
would like to imagine really exists over the universe. .
The employment  of braided and unbraided patterned
functions allow one to model an enormous variety of branching
models: point-source causation, strict Lagrangian or substrate
causation, back-branching causation, etc. By investigating larger
classes of automorphic functions, and employing the full diversity
of coding schemes that are totally or partially back-reconstructible
from key moments, one should be able to generate useful models
for every imaginable form of universal causal structure.
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Each seed injects a new causal process into the flow. This
may cancel or overshadow all previous inputs, or become
integrated with them. The process is analogous to the way in
which a new instrumental sound introduced into the texture of a
symphony may blend with the flow, or soar above,  dominate it,
or perform a solo cadenza while all others remain silent.  When the
new input only makes a contribution to the whole without
supplanting them,  predictions of the future course of the system
demand knowledge, not only of  the algorithmic process for
extracting causal information from a specific seed, tn , but
information about the application of such procedures to all
previous seeds tn-1 , tn-2 ,......
This conception has a close correspondence with our daily
experience. Indeed this is the way   science works in practice.  For
example, no competent historian would claim to explain the
political geography of the world in terms of the outcome of a
single war. In his quest to understand and the national
boundaries of today’s world , he would study all wars and treaties
as far back as necessary or reasonable. He would recognize that
the Roman Empire, the Holy Roman Empire, the Hundred Years
War, Thirty Years War, Napoleon, World War I and II, etc., have
all made their contributions to today’s political landscape.
Eventually he would come to the understanding that  the fictive
homogeneity which one attributes to the nations of, say, Western
Europe, ( those whose boundaries have not changed significantly
since the decade after WWII) , is no more than a convenient
illusion . Active separatist movements exist today in Northern
Ireland , Spain, France ( the Bretons), Belgium and elsewhere. As
for Eastern Europe, a country such as Yugoslavia never was
anything but an idea constrained by a label. As of this date its
disintegration is very much with us.  All  national boundaries of
all countries are the residues and reflections of previous wars,
invasions, explorations and  political negotiations .  Point-source
causation is the only mode of determinism suitable for
historiography.
(a) Autonomous and Determinable
Seeds
Point source causation always presupposes a set of
privileged moments of emanation or seeds, at which some kind of
Lagrangian computational process may be applied for predictive
purposes. Seed moments are of two kinds
A. Autonomous seeds, which are not computable or
predictable from previous collections of seeds.
B. Determinable seeds, which are determinable from
computations on one or more seeds in their past.
In most situations of interest ,  seeds manifest
themselves in the form of explosions   :  essential singularities of
one or more of the measurable observables.  As a general rule,
although there are  algorithms for deriving the world line of a
system S  from their neighborhoods , knowledge of the
configuration of   S at those moments is unattainable.
The standard model of the Big Bang is the paradigm for the
explosive form  of point source causation  . One may also site the
Hawking model for the decay of a Black Hole from the moment
when it becomes isolated  from the rest of universal causality.  The
Hawking-Penrose Cosmic Censorship Hypothesis states that no
acausality can radiate from the interior of a Black Hole. However,
2nd quantization Hawking radiation is in effect a kind of
radiation of autonomous causation   from its surface.
“ The singularities produced by
gravitational collapse occur only in
places, like Black Holes, where they are
decently hidden from outside view by an
event horizon....it protects observers who
remain outside the Black Hole from the
consequences of the breakdown of
predictability that occurs at the
singularity....”
Pg. 88 A Brief History of Time  ; Stephen W. Hawking,
Bantam Books, 1988
The  conditions for point source causal algebras are :
(i) The possibilities for constructing the world-line from local
information, are restricted to a discrete set, fine, countable or
unique, of seeds. In general one requires information about the
configuration of the system in all seeds proceeding the one under
consideration. In teleological models, which are not strictly
Lagrangian, ( as all such neighborhoods are intervals of infinite
length )  information obtainable from neighborhoods around
eternity, or the end of time, allow one to back-reconstruct a world-
line.
(ii)  Events separated by a seed moment are not causally
connected. For events between  two seed moments there may be
some small-scale connection  to refer back to the left-hand seed to
relate them causally.
(iii) From  any instant τ  outside  Ω  there is no Lagrangian
procedure for constructing the world line beyond the immediate
neighborhood of that instant.
Examples from daily life are legion. Consider the
correspondences in the vocabularies of two cognate languages,
such as Spanish and French. Beyond a certain point it is not
possible to establish their direct connection save by appeal to their
parent source, which is Latin.
Micro-organisms like amoebae which reproduce by splitting,
materially represent the sorts of natural branching tree diagrams
associated with point-source causation.
If , as is believed, our universe originated in a great
explosion, the reconstruction of its history from the present back
to the Big Bang isn’t possible without some direct evidence from
the neighborhood of that event. That this is possible to obtain is
due to the peculiar relationship of time to distance in a relativistic
universe. By looking ever further out in space, say with the
Hubble telescope, one also looks back in time, However, there is
absolutely no way one can predict what one will see at any
distance beyond that which has already been penetrated; and
what one does see must materially alter ones picture of the entire
evolution of the cosmos up to the present moment.
Point-source algebras are most appropriate for the modeling
of explosions. A terrorist plants a bomb in some office building,
which  explodes with terrifying force. Someone situated at some
distance from the explosion,  who is hit by debris  at time t1
cannot say , from any amount of analysis of this debris,  anything
about whatever  may be coming his way at  a later time t2 .
However, from the viewpoint of the terrorists, knowledge of the
composition and capabilities of the bomb , the character of the
structure being destroyed, and the way in which the bomb was
placed within the structure, has given  them quite a lot of
information about the way in which the debris will be scattered
over time and space.
Another obvious area for the application of point-source
algebras is Catastrophe Theory. The localized differential topology
on one of the  sheets of the 3-D surface of a standard bifurcation
catastrophe gives no information about the structure of the flow
of world-lines on any of the  other sheets. But study of an
infinitesimal neighborhood around any of the bifurcation
singularities will provide complete causal information about the
unfolding of events on all the sheets emanating from it.
 (b)  Computation Schemes for Essential
Singularities
Let Π(t) be bounded and periodic with period ω  = 1 for
convenience . Π  is assumed continuous . Also , Π(t)  ≠ 0 for all t.
Under these conditions , which are easily generalized, we will
construct a causal algebra consisting of agents of the form Λ(t) =
Π(1/t) .
Three methods are presented  for assembling a table of
numbers, computed in the neighborhood of the origin, by which
one may construct the arc of  Λ(t)  for all positive t.   All of them
derive from the following observation:
Let {tj } be an indexed,  countably dense subset of points in
[0,1] . Since Π has period 1, we have for all pairs of positive
integers N, j :
Λ(1 N + t j ) = Π(N + t j ) = Π(t j ) = Λ(1 t j )
Therefore, by making N sufficiently large so that 1/(N+tj ) is in the
interval (0,ε ), we can, from the values Λ  in that interval, calculate
the value of Π(tj) . 
Next let N = j, and let ∆   be the collection of values ,{
1/(N+tN) }.  Given ε , only a finite number of the elements of ∆
will lie outside the interval (0,ε ) . Therefore, evaluating Λ  at the
points of ∆ creates a countably dense set of ordinates for Π(x) in (
0, 1)  . Since Π is assumed to be continuous, we thereby obtain
sufficient information to compute its entire arc.
METHOD 1: Enumerate all the rationals in the
interval (0,1) . For example one might use the Cantor J-function. If
r = a/b, then
J(r) =
(a + b)2 + 3a + b
2
METHOD II: The inverse binary method. Let B be
the collection of all binary decimals of finite length in (0,1) . If  b ε
B , then we may write it as
b = 0.E1
bE2
bE3
b .....Ek
b ,with
Ej
b = {10, j ≠ k,and
Ek
b = 1
Under this representation of b, define the  “reversed binary
integer”, b*, given by b* = Ek
bEk−1
b Ek−2
b .....E1
b , interpreted as
a binary integer. The collection of integers {b*} is Z+ . This sets up
a  natural 1-1 correspondence between the integers and a
countably dense set in (0,1) .
Define  τb = b + b* , and  σb = 1/ τb  . Referring back to the
functions Π and Λ , we have Λ( σb  ) =Π ( τb ) = Π(b) . The values
of b* can be used to index the set { σb   }. As this index augments,
the finite binary decimals sweep back and forth across the unit
interval in a net of increasing refinement:
EXAMPLE:
Π(x) = Sin(x);Λ(x) = Sin(1x)
b b* τb σb Λ(σb ) = Π(τb )
1 12
3
2
2
3 0.99
2 14
9
4
4
9 0.77
3 34
15
4
4
15 −0.57
4 18
33
8
8
33 −0.83
5 58
45
8
8
45 −0.61
6 38
51
8
8
51 0.09
The systematic list of coefficients on the right fulfills, for
point-source causality,  the same role  as the coefficients of a Taylor
series for Lagrangian causality.
METHOD III: Let ζ be some irrational number.
Then the numbers
kn = nζ − [nζ ]  will be uniformly dense in (0,1) . Let bn = 1nζ
, and look at the values of Λ(bn ) . Since
Λ(bn ) = Π(nz) = Π(nζ − [nζ ])  , a large enough quantity of
these will produce a close approximation to Π(ζ) in (0.1).
(i) Fourier Summability
If Π(x) is Fourier-summable, one may calculate Λ(x) from its
behavior at the origin. The method employed closely resembles
that of calculating the differential coefficients of a Taylor’s series.
Let ω = 2 π  , and assume that Π(t) may be represented  by a
Fourier series of the  form :
Π(t) = a0 2 + {ak cos(kt)+ bk sin(kt)
k=1
∞
∑ }
Then the corresponding series for Λ (x) is given by
Λ(t) = a0 2 + {ak cos(k / t)+ bk sin(k / t)
k=1
∞
∑ }
By constructing an algorithm for calculating these coefficients
around the origin, we can plot the rest of the arc of Λ (t)
throughout all positive time.  Through Fourier analysis we know
that for each k,
ak = 1π Π(s)cos(ks)ds0
2π∫  .
Since Π(x) is periodic  this integral can also be written in the form:
ak = lim
L→∞
1πL Π(s)cos(ks)ds2πL
4πL∫
By a change of variables, this becomes:
ak = lim
L→∞
2
L Π(2πs)cos(2πks)dsL
2L∫
Let z = 1/s  , ds = -(dz)/z2  . Since Λ(z) = Π(1/z) , one obtains:
ak = lim
L→∞
2
L
Λ(z 2π )cos(2πk / z)dz
z212L
1
L∫
Letting ε = 1/L  ,
Jk (ε ) =
1
2 Λ(z 2π )cos(2πk / z)dzz2ε
2
ε
∫
Finally :  ak = limε→0
ε
Jk (ε )  . The coefficients { ak } and {bk }
may therefore be derived from any arbitrary neighborhood of an
essential singularity in a manner thoroughly analogous to that
used for the computation of Taylor or Fourier  coefficients.
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